LETHAL CRAPSHOOT: THE FATAL UNRELIABILITY OF THE
PENALTY PHASE
KEVIN M. DOYLE *

"Ilove judges, and! love courts. They are my ideals that typify on earth
what we shall meet hereafter in heaven under a just God."
William Howard Taft'
1. INTRODUCTION

Capital sentencing today is reliable and predictable, consistent and
nonarbitrary, transparent and verifiable in its accuracy. In contrast to the
wide-open, amorphous approach briefly tolerated in McGautha v.
California, capital decision making is now channeled and anchored. The
deliberate and rational have displaced the impressionistic and visceral.
Aggravation is well delineated and delimited better still; prejudicial
irrelevancies are held at bay. Mitigation, virtually without limit, is culled
and compassionately comprehended in relation to culpability.
With
exactitude and objectiveness worthy of the mathematical universe,
mitigating factors are weighed against aggravating factors.
This process abounds with check, balance, and backstop. It resolves
the tension between individuated fairness and principled treatment of like
cases alike. So long as the right to counsel is taken seriously, the
sentencing process perfects the complementarity ofjustice and mercy.
Yes, all this is true - and the moon is made of green cheese.
Aggravating factors, even as defined by statute, are both elastic and
porous. Jurors can adapt them to accommodate whatever factual element
strikes them as most offensive, no matter how arbitrary or impermissible.
. Kevin M. Doyle founded New York State's Capital Defender Office in 1995
and served as Capital Defender until the spring of 2008. The author thanks Glenda
Grace, Susan Salomon, Barry Fisher, and Russell Stetler for their assistance and, more,
spirited challenges.
1 William Howard Taft, quoted in Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard
Taft, in 3 THE JUSlICES OF THE SUPREME COURI 1789-1969, 2105, 2103-2132 (Leon

Friedman and Fred Israel eds., 1980).
2 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding as constitutional a jury's imposition of the death
penalty without governing standards, as well as the constitutionality of a jury's
determination of guilt and penalty after only a single trial and single verdict).
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The uncovering and presentation of life-history-mitigation evidence
are inherently difficult and bound to fail too much of the time, in whole or
part, even when the defense team enjoys adequate training and resources.
Mitigation of a more abstract, scientific character finds a chilly reception
among jurors long ago alerted to the dangerous flimflam of the "Twinkie
defense" and its ilk. Mental health experts improve matters little, if at all.
Most fundamentally, there is no common - much less prescribed understanding of the extent to which mitigating evidence of any variety
should favor leniency. The subjectiveness of all this, fatal in itself, almost
entraps jurors into racially-tainted decision making.
Capital sentencing, aspirations and pretensions aside, amounts to a
crapshoot. It is a game of chance implicating stakes that may not
constitutionally ride on luck, certainly not today when we can incapacitate
so readily through a life sentence without parole.
II.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS' INEVITABLE ENTANGLEMENT WITH
IMPERMISSIBLE CONSIDERATIONS

Ideally, a set of aggravating factors, especially when confined to
those statutorily identified, would operate as does the best-designed, most
specialized net. Drawn through the sea of evidence, an aggravating factor
should capture only those things rationally related to a defendant's
culpability. Instead, aggravating factors scoop up not only morally relevant
reasons for severity but also every species of arbitrary, impermissible
muck.
This necessarily happens for two reasons: First, trial is more literary
than linear; and this is no less true in the bifurcated setting of a capital trial.
Aggravating factors, even while taking form in statute, derive their weight
from the peculiar case "story." Second, jurors absorb evidence in a
courtroom, not a vacuum.

A. Trial Stories
The effective trial lawyer tells a story. That is what the prosecution
aims to do; that is what the defense aims to do. Stories organize and
convey information. Stories hold attention. Stories engender attorney
credibility and rapport.
Stories operate on the plane of understanding but also the plane of
will. The story that unfolds successfully at trial imparts data necessary for
a given verdict. But it also impels the jury to deliver that verdict,
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notwithstanding reluctance to do so; the story registers cognitively but also
asserts itself volitionally. Thus stories amount to more than the sum of
their parts. They penetrate the moral imagination to link facts, organically
and irrevocably, both within the narrative and within the juror who has
internalized the narrative by way of bringing himself to render a
condemning verdict.
In Old Chief v. United States,3 Justice Souter unabashedly
acknowledges both how "making a case with testimony and tangible things
not only satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful
story with descriptive richness" and how such a "colorful story with
descriptive richness" can spur a hesitant jury.
Recognizing the
prosecution's ordinary prerogative to prove its case with evidence of its
choosing, Justice Souter wrote for the majority:
Unlike an abstract premise, whose force depends on going
precisely to a particular step in a course of reasoning, a piece
of evidence may address any number of separate elements,
striking hard just because it shows so much at once; the
account of a shooting that establishes capacity and causation
may tell just as much about the triggerman's motive and
intent. Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of
reasoning,and as its pieces come together a narrative gains
momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to
sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences,
whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.

This persuasivepower of the concrete and particularis often
essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations
that the law places on them. Jury duty is usually unsought
and sometimes resisted, and it may be as difficult for one
juror suddenly to face the findings that can send another
human being to prison, as it is for another to hold out
conscientiously for acquittal. When a juror's duty does seem
hard,the evidentiary account of what a defendant has thought
and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statements
ever could, notjust to prove a fact but to establish its human
significance, and so to implicate the law 's moral
underpinnings and a juror's obligation to sit in judgment.
Thus, the prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence
before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to
3 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).
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support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a
guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to
point to the discrete elements of a defendant's legal fault.4
A problem in penalty phase is that the "story of guiltiness" carries
through from guilt phase. "[T]he concrete and particular" from the first
stage wield "persuasive power" in favor of execution, whether or not that
"concrete and particular" bear legitimate relation to death-worthiness. This
might not be so if aggravating factors did not, as a practical matter, absorb,
and draw their power from, the specifics of the given case. Yet they do.
Trial tells a story. Aggravation is a creature of the story.
Nowhere does aggravation comprise only bare penal-law elements.
Many states' capital statutes make no effort at, or pretense of, precisely
defining or identifying aggravation beyond the statutory aggravating factor
required, by Zant v. Stephens,5 to render the defendant eligible for the death
penalty. 6
New York, unlike most capital states, allows capital sentencers to
consider only those- aggravating factors both set out in statute and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.7
Those factors, however, serve largely as
dredges, into which the "concrete and particular" fall and onto which the
"concrete and particular" barnacle. This is because the aggravating factors'
all-decisive weight must ordinarily reflect "the nature and circumstances of
the count or counts of murder in the first degree for which the defendant
was convicted." 8
4Id. at 187-88 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
5 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (indicating that statutory aggravating circumstances

serve the necessary function of circumscribing the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty, yet noting that ignoring other possible aggravating factors in the process of
selecting who will actually be sentenced to death is not required by the Constitution).
6 See

generally James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, AggravatingCircumstances

and Capital Punishment Law: Rhetoric or Real Reforms, 29 CRIM. L. BUIIL. 467, 496 &
n.145 (1993) (discussing the role of nonstatutory aggravating factors): Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Aggravating and MitigatingFactors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and
Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 374-81

(1998) (further discussing the court's decision in Zant, as well as, the court's treatment of
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in other cases).
C.P.L. § 400.27(3).
C.P.L. § 400.27(6) (certain prior convictions, as also defined by statute, may
also be considered. See C.P.L. § 400.27(7)).
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Aggravation is then case-specific, not generic. The defendant will
be punished not simply for first-degree murder. He will be punished for the
first-degree murder he committed at a certain place and time, of a specific
victim, animated by particular motivations and under unique circumstances
all of which the jury will have learned in great detail.
Whether left wide-open or, as in New York, ostensibly narrowed,
aggravation ultimately becomes a matter of gestalt or narrative impression
rather than a discrete category born of, or subject to, objective analysis.
Each juror absorbs, consciously or unconsciously, from the whole body of
evidence or, rather, from the "story of guiltiness" the juror has
internalized - her own reasons to execute, with9 little or no assurance as to
the rationality or permissibility of those reasons.
The most obvious hazards arising from this go to race and victim
worth. Neither the race of the defendant nor the race of the victim may
9 A warning signal as to the Rorschach qualities of all aggravation issued early
from capital jurisdictions trying to standardize calculations through statutorily prescribed
variations on the aggravator "heinous, atrocious, and cruel." For instance, in his dissent
in Walton v. Arizona, Justice Blackmun noted how Arizona sentencers would tie
themselves in knots to establish the presence of this aggravator because they:

find heinousness and depravity on the basis of 'gratuitous violence' if the
murderer uses more force than necessary to kill the victim, see State v.
Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 696 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Ceja, 612 P.2d 491,
496 (Ariz. 1980), but the murder will be deemed cruel if the killer uses
insufficient force and the victim consequently dies a lingering death, see
State v. Chaney, 686 P.2d 1265, 1282 (Ariz. 1984). A determination that
a particular murder is *senseless' will support a finding of depravity; but
a murder to eliminate a witness is also depraved, a murder for pecuniary
gain is covered by a separate aggravating circumstance, and evidence
showing that the defendant killed out of hatred for the victim or a desire
for revenge may be used to buttress the court's conclusion that the killer
'relished' the crime. See State v. Je//ers, 661 P.2d 1105, 1131 (Ariz.
1983). In State v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 232, 238 (Ariz. 1986), the court's
determination that the crime was "senseless" (and therefore heinous and
depraved) was based in part on the fact that the defendant 'steadfastly
maintains there was no reason or justification for what he did' - this in
a case where the defendant argued that his remorse for the crime
constituted a mitigating factor.
497 U.S. 639, 696-97 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (parallel citations omitted).
Justice Blackmun even noted a case in which it was found "that a particular murder was
committed both for an unworthy purpose and for no purpose at all." Id. at 696 n.18
(emphasis in original). Most alarming perhaps, all the findings Justice Blackmun
criticized issued not from jurors but judges, appellate and trial.
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constitutionally weigh in death's favor. 10 That each has historically, and
does statistically, cannot surprise, given the untnistakableness of racial
identity at trial and the nature of racial prejudice.
At trial, physical appearance betrays the racial identity of a black
capital defendant or a white capital murder victim. The defendant sits
within spitting distance of the jury when he is identified by an arresting
officer; the jury sees victim photographs and family member witnesses who
identify the decedent. Jurors do not have to ferret out the racial facts.
Nor do prejudiced jurors have to choose a reaction; prejudice is selfstarting. Whether a family legacy, an illogical inference from embittering
experience, or assimilation from mass culture, prejudice involves
conditioned response at least as much as conscious choice. it
10Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (stating that it would be deemed
unusual punishment if the death penalty were inflicted on a defendant because of
discrimination based on race, religion, wealth, social position, or class). See also C.P.L.
§§ 270.16, 470.30(3)(b).
11People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 95 (2003) (Smith, J., concurring) ("But how
many jurors who hold views determined largely by race, which can range from virulent to
latent, will publicly acknowledge their views during voir dire?"). See also McDonough
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1983) ("The bias of a juror
will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, 'partly because the juror may have an interest
in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it."')
(Brennan, J., concurring), quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1982):
Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244, 249 (1st Cir. 1961) ("Certainly prospective jurors, like
everyone else, suffer from a variety of biases and prejudices of which they are not
aware."); People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 874 n.2 (Cal. 1981) (studies suggest "that the
accuracy of a person's estimation of his own fair mindedness is likely to be inversely
proportional to the depth of his actual prejudices and predispositions.").
Few things can better illustrate the elusive, insidious, nonvolitional nature of
prejudice than its appearance among those whose personal moral greatness we, as a
nation, unanimously celebrate as having stood the test of time. And we need look no
further than one of the greatest figures of the Revolutionary Period and one of the
greatest figures of the Civil War Era.
Abigail Adams believed in the intellectual, moral, and spiritual equality between
black and white Americans. This was, for her, not just a matter of political pretension but
personal conviction, to which she gave defiant expression in her own New England
community. Nonetheless, in the middle 1780's, Adams attended a London stage
production of OTHELLO. Whether arising from "the prejudices of education" or "natural
antipathy," Adams' reaction to the interracial sexuality was startling to her: "My whole
soul shuddered whenever I saw the sooty heretic Moor touch the fair Desdemona."
Consider how much deeper the shudder would have run, had Othello been played by a
black actor, rather than a white player in make-up. David McCullough, JOHN ADAMS
345-46, 480 (Simon & Schuster 2001).
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Race then differs from a confession or forensic lab test, it is not
something that is incorporated or rejected after deliberation. No, this piece
of the "concrete and particular" automatically becomes part of the
"narrative," the story, which has brought the jury to penalty phase.
For instance, as Nicholson McCoy proceeded into his sentencing
phase, the "story of guiltiness" did not change in Suffolk County. The
story continued to feature a 6'5", 275-pound dark-skinned AfricanAmerican sexually victimizing and killing a petite white co-employee. 12
The story also still included the poignant facts that McCoy's victim
was a mechanic's wife, that the couple had only recently been able to buy 13a
home, and that they had two small children and hoped for more.
Likewise, as Stephen LaValle's Suffolk County jury embarked on penalty
phase, they knew and could not "unknow" or "unlearn" that LaValle's
victim, varsity track-coach Cynthia Quinn, met her terrible death while
trying to fit in an early morning run as her young daughter and younger son
slept back at the house. 14
So, just as race is embedded in the "story of guiltiness," which has
moved the jury to convict for capital murder, so are particulars that
emotionally color the decedent, regardless of whether these particulars go
to a defendant's culpability. These particulars too remain embedded as the
jury decides a defendant's ultimate fate. One need not wonder why jurors
so frequently decide on sentence before commencement of the penalty
phase. 15
What American greater than Frederick Douglass occupied the public square in
the Civil War Era? Abraham Lincoln maybe. Notwithstanding Douglass's remarkable
breadth of experience, depth of intellect, and fervor of conviction, even he was not
immune from prejudice. Writing in 1846 about his recent travels in Ireland, Douglass,
with great compassion and almost too much vividness, recounts a poverty that called to
his mind the "same degradation as the American slaves" suffered. Settling on the
"immediate cause" and perhaps the "main cause of the extreme poverty," Douglass
indicted Irish "intemperance" in alcohol consumption. THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, EARLY YEARS 1817-1849 138-42 (Phillip S. Foner, ed., 1975).
The intemperance Douglass observed no doubt worsened conditions. Still, what is
striking about Douglass's theory of Irish poverty is that, by 1846, Ireland was in the
midst of a potato famine (caused by blight).
12 Record on Appeal at 13706, 14408-09, 17452, 29390, People v. McCoy
(March 31, 2003) (Suffolk County Indictment No. 2582-98).
13Id. at

13705-08.

14 Record on Appeal at 13350, 13441-42, 13432-36, People v. Stephen LaValle, 3

N.Y.3d 88 (N.Y. 2004) (Suffolk County Indictment No. 1350-97).
iS William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing:
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To be sure, some illicit aggravation may be filtered out of the
sentencing process
maybe a great deal. Defense lawyers can bring
motions in limine before trial as to some facts and arguments. Some
conscientious prosecutors will err on caution's side; certain trial courts will
effectively curb some of the rest. And this will reduce the risk of
constitutional contaminants.
Still, illicit aggravation will hobble reliable sentencing in a
significant number of capital cases, because contaminants will inevitably
seep through in the majority of cases. And we dare not indulge the notion
that they can always be checked through prophylactic or curative jury
instructions.
The very nature and insidiousness of this illegitimate
aggravation defies such measures: Some of the illicit material, such as race,
simply falls beyond the reach of ad hoc jury instruction.
As to other contaminants, explicitly identifying, invoking, and
reprising them, in the guise of preventative instructions, would only risk
compounding the harm.1 6 In either event, "it would be quixotic to expect
the jurors to perform [the] mental acrobatics,"' 17 _ not to mention the
emotional ones
that such "curatives" would demand. 18
It beggars reality, then, to assume or even hope that jurors can
mentally purge those images and elements of the "story of guiltiness" that
jeopardize a fair sentence, certainly not when they make the emotionally

Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83
CORNLLL L. REV. 1476 (1998) (based on interviews with some one thousand capital
jurors in more than ten states and revealing that nearly half of them felt they knew what
the punishment should be before sentencing phase).
16 Cf, e.g., United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 492-493 (2d Cir. 1994) (in
finding laudable but doomed to failure the trial judge's effort at "damage control,"
observing: "Inthe course of giving this limiting instruction, the judge reminded the jurors
repeatedly that Jones was a convicted felon as he simultaneously asked them to put this
consideration out of their minds .... ); People v. Griffin, 242 A.D.2d 70, 73 (1 st Dept.
1998) (in finding ineffective the trial judge's effort to "unring the bell" regarding
prejudicial testimony, appellate court notes the judge's acknowledgment to the jury, "I
know the longer I talk about it the harder it is to put it out of your mind.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17Jones,

16 F.3d 487, at 493.

18See generally Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (presumption that
a jury will follow limiting instructions disappears where a great probability exists that the
jury will be unable to follow them and the evidence is highly damaging to the defense).
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charged, and profoundly subjective, decision between execution and lifewithout-parole. As Old Chief explains, the juror has adopted a story, but,
too, the story
unfiltered
may well have adapted the juror, making the
juror one willing to return a verdict of condemnation.
B. FunctionalAggravationfrom Outside the Record
Finally, assume flawless in limine rulings, absolutely circumspect
advocacy, and impeccable juror obedience to instruction all occur. As a
result, nothing in evidence weighs in aggravation that ought not weigh in
aggravation. Even still, sentencing error is in the offing. Because the
undeniable, inescapable, on-the-ground truth is that some of the most
devastating aggravation comes from outside the body of evidence.
Jurors observe. They observe outside the courthouse. They observe
outside the courtroom's well. And, above all, they observe defendant at
counsel table, from the first day of jury selection through sentencing
verdict.
Notwithstanding efforts to protect jurors from outside influences,
real life intrudes. In many instances, sidewalk protests against the death
penalty have greeted venirepersons as they reported on their first day of
jury duty as a capital case got underway.19 In all likelihood, this, ironically,
has led many execution-averse venirepersons to exclude themselves
automatically rather than examine their ability to set aside personal views
and faithfully serve.
Apart from demonstrations are news reports and opinion pieces.
Presumably, jurors ordinarily avoid, at the behest of the trial court, stories
directly pertaining to the case on trial. Still, wholly independent events
picked up in the news potentially alter jury opinion. Heaven help the
defense lawyer summing up in penalty phase the day after a widely
reported prison break. Good luck to the prosecutor summing up in penalty
phase the same20week as DNA evidence brings belated exoneration to a
murder convict.
19 In the Nabes: Death Penalty Opposed, DAILY NEwS, Apr. 27, 1998, at I
(describing protest outside of Brooklyn Supreme Court during jury selection for Darrel
Harris); Raymond Hernandez, Rochester Man is Sentenced to Death for a 1996 Slaying,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at B5 ("opponents of the death penalty staging daily protests
outside the courthouse"); Melanie Gleaves-Hirsch, Bishop Joins Death-PenaltyFoes, A
Group that Regularly Protests the State Law Invited Moynihan to Participate,THE POSTSTANDARD (Syracuse), Aug. 12, 1999, at B I ("a group of death penalty opponents, who
gather at Columbus Circle the last Thursday of each month").
20 By way of real-life illustration, a New York State sentencing jury considered
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Obviously, nobody engineers prison escapes or post-conviction
vindications to tilt a capital jury. Most often, commentary also emerges as
a matter of coincidence.
Yet, in at least one instance here in New York State, one would have
to have wondered. On the very morning a penalty phase commenced, an
op-ed by the District Attorney himself appeared in the city's only major
newspaper. The op-ed essentially made three points: that "death cases are
for the very worst of all defendants who commit the most heinous
murders"; that the decision to seek death, "the most awesome decision that
any district attorney will ever make," had been exercised only "with the
greatest care"; and the District Attorney's office at trial was a David
fighting the Goliath of the Capital Defender Office. The name of the young
man whose penalty phase was beginning appeared nowhere in the District
21 The jury was thus free to read it. 22
Attorney's commentary.
Inside the courtroom but still outside the record, members of the
23
victim's family and the defendant's family are bound to draw attention.
Often victims' rights, law enforcement, or anti-death-penalty groups might
turn out in force for some or all of the proceeding.
We might pretend that all these presences offset each other in each
case, leaving every jury uninfluenced. But wishing does not make it so.
the fate of a capital defendant around the same time that the local paper prominently
reported on an Appellate Division decision not to disbar the District Attorney's spouse; a
federal jury had returned felony convictions against the spouse. Among the mitigating
factors in the capital case was the young defendant's intoxication during his detestable
spree of violence. Among the "mitigating factors" argued to the appellate court by the
District Attorney's spouse was completion of alcohol counseling, though the spouse's
convictions were for sophisticated tax fraud and tax evasion spanning several years.
Timothy O'Connor, Al Pirro Law License Suspended for 3 Years, Journal News, May
15, 2003, at lB. This timing and juxtaposition could not have displeased the defense.
21
Howard Relin, The Debate: Death Penalty, Rochester Democrat and
Chronicle, June 19, 2000, at 7A.
22 The trial court's instruction to the jurors on media exposure was narrow and
the trial prosecutor successfully opposed the defense application for the court to voir dire
on the op-ed. Record on Appeal, Penalty Phase Trial Minutes at 103-11, People v.
Santiago, 95 N.Y. 2d 838 (N.Y. 2000).
23 Nine of Stephen LaValle's sentencing jurors recorded as an unlisted but
established mitigator "Family support in courtroom." Jury Sentencing Determination and
Findings Form, People v. LaValle, 697 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Aug. 6, 1999) (Suffolk County
Court No. 1350-97). The presence of various victims' family members surely registered
with Taylor's jury. Brief for Appellant at X.B.3 (Victim Worth and Rights), 9 N.Y. 3d
129, (N.Y. 2007).
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And, yes, Musladin v. Lamarque24 _ to be heard in the United States
Supreme Court come fall and arising from a trial court's allowing three
members of a victim's family to wear buttons with the victim's photograph,
while seated prominently behind the prosecution during trial - may issue
some guidance. No court, high or low, will, however, choreograph court
attendees precisely enough to place the jury beyond effect.
Last and most dangerous, the in-court appearance and demeanor of
the defendant throughout the proceedings inevitably draw intense juror
attention and exert influence, even though they are not in evidence and may
be wholly misleading as indicia of death-worthiness.
People judge other people by appearance. These judgments extend
to moral assessment. Leonardo da Vinci was not speaking in code when he
asserted that "Beauty Adorns Virtue"; 25 he was conveying a universal
intuition.
Social science research confirms that attractiveness can bear on a
noncapital defendant's treatment in the criminal justice system.26 Where a
death notice looms, the judgment potentially in the offing is more plainly
absolute and radical than any other passed within our legal system. The
jury's scrutiny of the capital defendant's person
his appearance and
demeanor - for characterological
clues
would
seem
inevitable,
as a matter
27
of common sense.
24 427 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. grantedsub nom. Carey v. Musladin, 126

S. Ct. 1769 (2006). (Carey v. Musladin , 127 S. Ct. 343 (2006), decided after submission
of Taylor's brief to the New York Court of Appeals, offered no such guidance.)
25 Leonardo da Vinci, Ginevra de' Benci, reverse, c. 1474/1478, tempera on
panel, National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., available at http://www.nga.gov/cgibin/pinfo?Object=50442+l+none (bearing the Latin motto virtutem fbrma decorat,
meaning "Beauty Adorns Virtue.").
26See, e.g., Diane S. Berry & Leslie Zebrowitz McArthur, Some Components and
Consequences of a Baby-face, 48 J. PERSONALIIY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 312 (1985)

(finding that students judged "baby-faced" adults as being more naive and rated them
not-guilty of intentional criminal acts more often than "mature-faced" adults); A. Chris
Downs & Phillip M. Lyons, Natural Observances of the Links Between Attractiveness
and Initial Legal, 17 PERSONAI ITY AND SOC. PSYCHOI.

Buii. 541 (1991)

(finding a

strong negative correlation between physical attractiveness of defendants in over 1500
misdemeanor cases in Texas and the amount of fines assessed by judges); John E.
Stewart, II, Defendants'Attractivenessas a Factor in the Outcome of CriminalTrials: An
Observational Study, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 348, 352-55 (1980) (finding in
Pennsylvania study that attractive people were significantly more likely to avoid
incarceration than were their unattractive counterparts). See also McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 317-18 (1987) (acknowledging the existence of such studies).
27See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005) ("The appearance of the
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But we need not trust only common sense. Studies substantiating
this fact are not in short supply. Researchers establishing the centrality of
remorse in the jury decision to kill or spare have repeatedly affirmed that
jurors regularly measure regret or recalcitrance based on their observation
of the defendant at counsel table. One study found mercy more freely
dispensed to the defendant who seemed "uncomfortable or ill at ease" or
chastened in a guilty verdict's wake. 28 The defendant whose manner
bespoke boredom or detachment found less favor. 29 Another study,
centering on California jurors, also found the defendant's courtroom
demeanor to have been the primary gauge for hard-heartedness or
contrition; woe befell the defendant who projected pride, nonchalance, or
30
cockiness, especially as graphic proof of his crime came into evidence.
This corroborated yet an earlier study that found a third of jurors citing
defendants' remorseless, "emotionless" demeanor as contributing to their

vote for execution. 31
The problem with juror assessment of defendant's nontestimonial
demeanor is threefold: It is not lawful, because such demeanor is not in
evidence. It is inevitable. It is unreliable.
New York, in keeping with most jurisdictions, holds that the
courtroom bearing of the accused is not in evidence. 32 Never mind that
comment on it might constitute comment on the defendant's right to remain

offender in shackles, however, almost inevitably implies to a jury, as a matter of common
sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger to the community ....
").
28 Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital
Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. RLV. 1599, 1617 (1998).
29 Id. See also Gary Goodpaster, The Trial For Life. Effective Assistance qf
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 332 (1983) ("Depending on
defendant's general demeanor and reaction to trial events, this [chance to observe the
defendant during trial] may dispose the sentencer in the defendant's favor.").
30 Scott Sundby, The Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy.
Remorse and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998).
31William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Trials, 15 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 1, 52
(1988). See also Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (noting that, when the
mentally retarded are capitally tried, "their demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.").
32 See, e.g., People v. Ferguson, 82 N.Y.2d 837, 838 (1993) (prosecutor's
summation assertion that defendant was taking notes during trial with his left hand
"constituted an improper reference to facts not in evidence" where no evidence was
elicited at trial regarding whether defendant was left- or right-handed).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol11/iss2/6

2007-20081

LETHAL CRAPSHOOT

silent. 33 Never mind that use of it could mean a price was exacted for the
defendant's exercising his right to attend his own trial.3 4
Courtroom bearing simply does not belong to the evidence.
Reliance on it, therefore, sets any resultant sentence outside the bounds of
due process and reliability.
The accused's courtroom bearing is not in evidence. But, of course,
most often it is
as a practical matter. Ask Professor Wigmore. "[I]t is as
unwise to attempt the impossible as it is impolitic to conduct trials upon a
fiction; and the attempt to force a jury to become mentally blind to the
behavior of the accused sitting before them involves both an impossibility
in practice and a fiction in theory. 35 Ask Scott Peterson, whose jurors,
after trial, underscored as a key reason for his death sentence 36his
remorseless manner throughout a trial at which he did not take the stand.
Even pausing the argument at this point, a constitutional infirmity is
clear. Due process presupposes that the factfinders and the advocates share
a common body of evidence. Argument centers on that body of evidence.
The relevant law applies to it. Some, most, or all jurors tapping into a side
store of evidence injects imbalance and subverts reliability. 37 This would
be so, even if the side evidence were reliable. But it is not.
Posture, gait, gestures, facial expressions, and contortions - all
these admit ambiguity under the most relaxed and ordinary circumstances.
38
A legal context can heighten the ambiguity. Hence, in People v. Basora,
this court held that evidence that the defendant smiled during his arrest
"thwart[ed] defendant's Fifth Amendment right" because it attributed
"communicative value" to the act of smiling. The evidence, this court said,
33 People v. Basora, 75 N.Y.2d 992, 993 (1990) (prosecutor's attributing
communicative value to defendant's smiling violates state and federal constitutional right
to remain silent).
34United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1209 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that the
defendant's "presence and his non-testimonial behavior in the courtroom could not be
taken as evidence of his guilt" and holding that the prosecutor's improper comments at
summation about those matters violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to trial
by jury and to be present).
352 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 274 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
36

See Laurie L. Levenson, But It's Not Evidence, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 2005, at

13. See also Andrea Peyser, A Just Verdict Finally Wipes That Silly Smirk Off Lousy
Creep's Face, N.Y. Post, Nov. 13, 2004, at 2.
37See People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 280 (1967) (holding an unauthorized
crime scene visit "in and of itself, constitutes inherent prejudice to the defendants.").
3' 75 N.Y.2d 992, 993.
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should not have been admitted because of its minimal probative value: "A
smile

. . .

can convey many different states of mind

for example, relief,

bewilderment, nervousness, exasperation or happiness. Admission of such
testimony as evidence of a consciousness of guilt was erroneous because
the evidence was ambiguous and its probative value minimal. ' 9
The artificiality and assigned roles of the courtroom increase
ambiguity of the nonverbal further still. 40

And then, when arising in the

uniquely pressurized circumstances of a capital trial and read off an
individual viewed through the scrim of a hideous capital indictment, the
ambiguity of nonverbal communication (real or imagined) multiplies a
hundredfold.
Now, finally, multiply one more time by the factor of cross-cultural
mistrust, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation.
Interpreters can bridge language differences to enable understanding
by, for, and of witnesses and defendants. Nobody, though, renders a
running translation of demeanor across racial, ethnic, or national lines.
Worse, at least where the spoken word is concerned, one is alerted to
a gap in understanding. Hearing Farsi, Hebrew, or Manx, one does not
mistake it for English and ascribe meaning. In contrast, it is almost
impossible to take in but not decipher, accurately or inaccurately, another's
manner. See a grimace, a raised eyebrow, a flared nose, a furrowed brow,
pursed lips, or a blank stare and you involuntarily take it to signal
something: maybe hostility or perhaps anguish; snideness or surprise; anger
or contempt; concentration or worry; condescension or secrecy;
indifference or shock.
Yet signals scramble as they cross cultural boundaries. Some
cultures encourage a more or less animated demeanor; a more formal or
vulnerable bearing; a greater or lesser degree of emotional transparency.
Courts have recognized the lethal dangers attending nonverbal
miscommunication - even where defendants have testified or have
otherwise had their demeanor legitimately available for factfinder or other
adjudicator assessment. Specifically, in Mak v. Blodgettj the Ninth
39Id.

at 994 (citations omitted). See also People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 442
(1927) (suggesting that the physician-decedent's seeming smile, after defendant told him
defendant's six-year-old had died, likely resulted from a facial twitch).
40Holtzman v. Manniello, 202 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960)
("Certainly, the interpretation of smiles and nods, conscious or unconscious, and the
mental operation of a juror are not the province of the court.").
41970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas relief from a death sentence in a highly
aggravated case, faulting trial counsel for, inter alia, failing to present an
expert witness to illuminate issues of cultural dislocation and differences:
Dr. Johnson would have discussed serious assimilation
problems experienced by many Chinese who are moved
during adolescence from Hong Kong to North America, and
certain values in the Chinese culture of Hong Kong which
could help to explain petitioner's involvement in criminal
activities here. [The testimony] would also suggest that
petitioner's apparent lack of emotion at trial did not
necessarily indicate disinterest or coldness, but42 was
consistent with culturalexpectations of Chinese males.
Thus, the defendant's in-court, nontestimonial demeanor makes for
one more potential source of illicit aggravation and unreliable sentencing.
Might it be checked by court instruction or expert testimony of the kind
discussed in Mak? In some at-risk43cases for some jurors but, realistically,
not for all jurors in all at-risk cases.
III. LIFE-HISTORY MITIGATION: DIFFICULTY IN UNCOVERING AND
IMPOSSIBILITY IN MEASUREMENT

The United States Constitution endows a capital defendant with the
rights to present and to have considered
in sentencing virtually anything
44
that favors sparing him from execution.
42 Id. at 618 n.5 (emphasis added).

Accord id. at 620. See also People v.
Superior Court (Du), 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding as within a
trial court's discretion a probationary sentence for manslaughter and crediting the trialcourt finding that the probation department's failure to discern defendant's remorse owed
to barriers of language and culture).
43 Inevitably, some capital defense counsel will reasonably, per Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), but wrongly conclude that court instruction or expert
testimony on a defendant's unfavorable demeanor would only exacerbate the problem.
Additionally, some jurors will inevitably react to a nontestifying defendant's demeanor,
notwithstanding a judge's charge or expert's opinion.
Further, since defendant's in-court nontestimonial demeanor belongs to the
category of things that "cannot be shown from a trial transcript," Riggins v. Nevada, 504

U.S. 127, 137 (1992), the problem of, and remedies for, prejudicial defendant demeanor
evade appellate reach in individual capital cases.
44 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603-605 (1978) (arguing that capital sentencer
must be allowed to grant independent weight to mitigating evidence of defendant's
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In some instances, a mitigation case will focus on commendable
behavior before the time of the crime or redeeming conduct since. 45 Lifehistory mitigation
i.e., evidence of abuse, neglect, and deprivation
during the formative years - however, has46long made up the most cogent
and common mitigation in capital litigation.
New York's experience since 1995 has not placed it apart in this.
New York saw fifteen cases go into penalty phase under the 1995 statute.
The penalty phase verdict sheet, the "Jury Sentencing Determination and
Findings Form," from each case reflects both mitigation argued by the
defense and mitigation independently identified by jurors. Taken together,
these verdict sheets reveal that in eleven of fifteen cases some evidence of
neglect, deprivation, or abuse was under consideration for its mitigating
value.4 7
character, record, and background, along with circumstances of the offense favoring less
harsh punishment); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-15 (1982) (explaining that
it is unconstitutional to disregard mitigation falling outside that statutorily defined);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) (explaining that it is unconstitutional to
bar evidence of defendant's good behavior while jailed for the current offense); Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-87 (2004) (rejecting requirement that mitigation must have
some nexus to the capital offense).
45 People v. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452, 473 (2002) ("During the riot, defendant
rescued a fellow corrections officer, an act of heroism that earned him a Medal of Honor
from the Department of Correction in 1987.").
46 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 ("Evidence of a difficult family history and of
emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation.") (citations
omitted); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 304 (1989) ("Those decisions are based on the
principle that punishment must be directly related to the defendant's personal culpability,
and that a defendant who commits crimes attributable to a disadvantaged background or
emotional and mental problems may be less culpable than one who has no such excuse.").
47Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Alvarez, (May
23, 2003) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, Indictment No. 1352/00); Jury
Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Gordon, (Dec. 18, 1998)
(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, Indictment No. 273/97);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Harris, (June 6, 1998)
(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings, Indictment No. 15265/96);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McCoy, (Aug. 16, 2000)
(County Court, Suffolk County, State of New York, Court Case No. 2582-98); Jury
Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McIntosh, (July 23, 1998)
(County Court of the State of New York, County of Dutchess, Indictment No. 146/96);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Mateo, (Dec. 16, 1998)
(County court of the State of New York, County of Monroe, Indictment No. 0914/96);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Owens, (Apr. 30, 2001)
(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Monroe, Indictment Nos. 547/99,
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The relevance of such evidence is obvious. Human action and
character emerge from personal choice but also from circumstances not
chosen. While we should hold the individual to account for how he has
played his cards, neither justice nor honesty allows us to pretend we are all
dealt the same hand or even draw from the same deck. The relevance of
life-history evidence is a given. We cannot say the same for its consistent
availability or ultimate measurability.
A. Time and Distance as Obstacles to a Complete, Accurate Penalty-phase
Presentation

Any defendant capitally prosecuted today in New York or elsewhere
in America will have passed his eighteenth birthday.48 Therefore, at best,
the defense will be reaching back over at least a decade to reconstruct not
just discrete, seminal events in his life but day-in-day-out patterns of
existence and interaction. "Over the years, the witnesses who were
acquainted with the defendant are likely to have become geographically
dispersed and more difficult to trace than guilt phase witnesses."" As a
practical matter, the defense's burdens of proof and production can become
impossible to bear.
To pretend otherwise locates capital sentencing advocacy in its own
alternative universe, a place very different from the one requiring the
doctrine of laches and statutes of limitations. Through these and other
common-law doctrines and statutes, as well as constitutional principles, the
law recognizes the difficulty of gathering, much less proving, facts after
great lapses of time. For example: "Statutes of limitation, like the equitable
doctrine of laches . . . are designed to promote justice by preventing

414/99); Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Parker, (Oct. 24,
1998) (County Court of the State of New York, County of Erie, Indictment No. 97-0762);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Santiago, (June 23,
2000)(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Essex, Indictment No. 99023); Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Shulman, (May 6,
1999) (County Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk, Indictment No. 111296); Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Taylor, (Nov. 26,
2002) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County, Indictment Nos.
1845/00, 1012/01).
48
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring execution for crimes
committed by juveniles).
49Gary Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 324 (1983).
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surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence50 has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.,
More particularly in the criminal justice arena, the passage of time
may render "too difficult . . . a retrospective determination of trial
competence" - where a competency hearing has been wrongly denied in
the first instance
thus requiring vacatur of the conviction. 51 "[T]ime's
erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony" - indeed, the overall
"effect of delay on adjudicative accuracy"
constitutes as well the major
prejudice concern underlying federal and state constitutional speedy-trial
and due-process-delay analysis. 52 In fact, in determining that this State's
due-process clause extends speedy-trial protection to juveniles, this Court
- with observations strikingly apt to the difficulties inherent in
reconstructing a capital defendant's life-history
noted that the effects of
delay
may be even more profound [than for an adult accused]. A
juvenile, experiencing the vicissitudes of childhood and
adolescence, is more likely to suffer from a lack of memory
than an adult. A juvenile is less likely than an adult to
preserve his or her memory concerning 53the incident in
question... and various other crucial details.
Of course, in some cases, records - whether from schools, social
agencies, or other institutions - may partially offset the difficulties
confronting the defense team in proving up mitigation originating in the
distant past. This possibility, however, offers limited solace. Put aside
lapses in reporting, investigation, recordation, and preservation that occur
in the best of circumstances. Put aside how anemic the printed word can
seem in comparison to a live witness. A disproportionate number of capital
defendants emerge from economically distressed communities wherein
50_Railroad Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944). Accord Covington v. Walker, 3 N.Y.3d 287, 293 (2004) (observing that such
policy considerations lie "at the heart of our statutes of limitations jurisprudence"). See
also, e.g., Tavarez v. City of New York, 26 A.D.3d 297, 298 (1st Dept. 2006) (rejecting
late notice-of-claim because of adversary's "loss of opportunity to locate witnesses while
memories were still fresh and other prejudice").
51People v. Peterson, 40 N.Y.2d 1014, 1015 (1976).
52

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 & n.2 (1992).

53In

re Benjamin L., 92 N.Y.2d 660, 669 (1999) (citations omitted).
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record-keeping ranks low in importance. 54 At least seven of the fifteen
men who proceeded through penalty phase under the 1995 statute were
born to poverty.55
Beyond poverty, a not insignificant number of capital defendants
come from elsewhere. According to the Death Penalty Information Center,
120 foreign nationals from thirty-two different countries currently await
execution across America and twenty-one foreign nationals have been put
to death since 1976. 56 Three of the fifteen men who faced sentencing juries
54 See J. Garbarino & D. Sherman, High-risk Neighborhoods and High-risk

Families. The Human Ecology of Child Maltreatment, 51 CHILD DEV., 188 (1980) (In a
study of communities within the Chicago metropolitan area, the areas at high risk for
child maltreatment were characterized by social disorganization (e.g., criminal activity)
and lack of social coherence (e.g., lack of availability and knowledge of social services
and support networks). See also J.Garbarino & K. Kostelny, Child Maltreatment as a
Community Problem, 16 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 455, 463 (1992) ("[P]ublic
agencies are pushed beyond their capacity to respond. The link between poverty and
child maltreatment continues as a powerful feature of the problem.").
A class-based handicap in penalty-phase preparation raises discrete race issues
insofar as poverty often correlates with race. The poverty rate for African-Americans
remains well over double that for white Americans (24.7% versus 10.8%). See
http://wvw.census.gov/hhes/ www/poverty/histpov/hstpov2.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2006). Black unemployment also persists at more than twice the level of white
unemployment (9.5% versus 4.1%). See http://www.bls.gov/data (follow "Access to
Historical Data for the W Tables" hyperlink; follow "Table A-2" hyperlink; check boxes
for "white unemployment rate" and "black unemployment rate"; and retrieve data.) (last
visited Aug. 25, 2006).
55Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Alvarez, (May
23, 2003) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, Indictment No. 1352/00); Jury
Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Gordon, (Dec. 18, 1998)
(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, Indictment No. 273/97);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McCoy, (Aug. 16, 2000)
(County Court, Suffolk County, State of New York, Court Case No. 2582-98): Jury
Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McIntosh, (July 23, 1998)
(County Court of the State of New York, County of Dutchess Indictment No. 146/96);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Owens, (Apr. 30, 2001)
(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Monroe, Indictment Nos. 547/99,
414/99); Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Santiago, (June
23, 2000)(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Essex, Indictment No. 99023); Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Taylor, (Nov. 26,
2002) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County, Indictment Nos.
1845/00, 1012/01).
56 See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (follow "Issues" hyperlink; then follow
"Foreign Nationals" hyperlink).
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under the 1995 statute struggled as children in underdeveloped societies
outside the continental United States.57
If time and distance present obstacles to mitigation's excavation and
exposition, they can pale in comparison to the stumbling blocks of shame
and secrecy.
B. Dirty Laundry Kept Hidden and Damaged Families Unmended
Even if the defense vaults every temporal and geographical
challenge, no small number of sentencing juries will deliver death verdicts
without having heard the neglect and abuse the defendant suffered growing
up in his dysfunctional family. Three things alert us to this inevitability:
Shame surrounding family flaws. Deficits common in dysfunctional
families. And the predictably poor reactions many of these families will
have when crisis descends in the form of a capital prosecution.
Most afflicted families will treat dysfunction, abuse, and neglect as
painfully private "dirty laundry." 58 Even when abuse constitutes a current,
ongoing threat, silence and secrecy frequently enshroud injurious abuse in
the home.50
57 Dalkeith McIntosh was born in Jamaica.

Siblings Plead for Life of Man
Facing Possible Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1998, at B5. Jury Sentencing
Determination and Findings Form, People v. Mcintosh, (July 23, 1998) (County Court of
the State of New York, County of Dutchess Indictment No. 146/96). Dennis Alvarez
came from Honduras. Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v.
Alvarez, (May 23, 2003) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, Indictment No.
1352/00). Jose Santiago spent his early years in Puerto Rico.
Jury Sentencing
Determination and Findings Form, People v. Santiago, (June 23, 2000)(Supreme Court of
the State of New York, County of Essex, Indictment No. 99-023).
58See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 440 n.26 (1990) ("Minors who are
victims of sexual or physical abuse often are reluctant to reveal the existence of the abuse
to those outside the home.") (citations omitted); In re: Commitment of Marino S., 293
A.D.2d 223, 225-26 (1 st Dept. 2002) (noting that, after child was being raped by father
and reported this to mother, mother "refused to believe" it and ordered her not "to lie;"
and that "most of' the child's other relatives knew of the abuse but made no report and
took no action).
Trash TV has enjoyed commercial success because its voyeur-exhibitionist
symbiosis falls outside the social norm; most Americans don't, under any
circumstances, want to recount to strangers histories of physical, sexual, or emotional
abuse. See SIEVE ALLEN, VULGARIANS Al I HE GAIE: TRASH TV AND RAUNCH RADIO:
RAISING STANDARDS OF POPULAR CULTURE (2001); Neal Gabler, The Culture Wars:
Audience Stays Superiorto the Exploilalk Shows, L.A. TIMES, March 19, 1995, at M 1.
59See Eric Nagourney, Women Often Hide Domestic Abuse from Doctors, N.Y.
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This cannot wholly surprise. The law recognizes, and ample
research corroborates, a strong link between shame and a history of
abuse.60
Families riddled with dysfunction and abuse are not just disinclined
toward disclosure of these evils and ills; they are communicatively disabled
in general.
As noted by renowned family therapist Virginia Satir,
dysfunctional families "have rigid rules, unclear and dishonest
communication patterns, low self-esteem among members, and weak ties to
the rest of the community ...[W]eak social ties are consistently cited as a
characteristic
of abusive families, as are rigid, autocratic family power
61
systems.

But, surely, a family is a family. And any family will surmount its
difficulties when one of its own faces literally mortal danger, right? If only
it were so.

A defendant's indictment for capital murder visits both fear and
scorn on a family.62 Far from being an occasion for family members
TIMES, May 30, 2006, at F6 ("Women are often reluctant to volunteer to doctors that they
are victims of domestic abuse, and doctors shy away from the subject . ..Domestic
violence was still grossly underaddressed in emergency rooms. It was discussed in just
under half the visits when patients had indicated a risk.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
60 People v. Leon, 209 A.D.2d 342 (1st Dept. 1994) (holding that prompt-outcry
evidence was wrongly admitted but harmlessly so, given essential reliability of outcry by
sexually abused child who felt fear, vulnerability, and shame): Staggs v. Commonwealth,
877 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Ky. 1994) (recognizing that victims of child sexual abuse are
frequently "locked in the psychological shackles of fear and bound in shamed silence");
In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 118 (N.J. 1993) (noting expert testimony that "shame,
humiliation, fear, and dependence of the victim" contribute to the under-reporting of
sexual harassment); State v.Edward L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 140 (W.Va. 1990) ("Because of
the child's confusion, shame, guilt, and fear, disclosure of [father's sexual] abuse is often
long delayed. When the child does complain of sexual abuse, the mother's reaction
frequently is disbelief, and she fails to report the allegations to the authorities.") (internal
citation omitted). See also Colette L. Hoglund, & Karen B. Nicholas, Shame, Guilt, and
Anger in College Sludenis Exposed to Abusive Family Environments, 10 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 141 (1995).
61 ALAN KEMP, ABUSE IN THE FAMILY: AN INTRODUCTION 25-26 (1998) (citing
VIRGINIA SATIR, THE NEW PEOPLEMAKING (1998)).

62 Perhaps telling of the hostility toward capital-defendant families is how little
they have been studied. Even limited study, however, has revealed episodes of threats,
harassment, and abuse from the community, even extending to young siblings forced to
leave school when school officials concluded there was an irresolvable mortal threat. Of
course, at least as often, fear is felt over the fate of the loved one potentially facing
execution. See Elizabeth Beck et. al., Seeking Sanctuary: Interviews with Family

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008

296

UNI. OFPENNSJL VIA JOORrAL OrLAV ANDSOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. I11

inevitably to rally and slip the shackles of secrecy and denial, a capital
prosecution can foreseeably result in a family's denial and terror, shame
and anger, renewed vulnerability and deep defensiveness.6 3 One study of
defendants' families still caught up in the capital process included, inter
alia, psychological assessments of twelve parents and one sibling. All but
two individuals were diagnosed as suffering from major depression; all
64

thirteen displayed symptoms suggestive of post-traumatic stress disorder.

This sample is, admittedly, small. But the findings are consistent with what
we know about many radically troubled families faced with disaster.
A family that has lived with severe abuse and dysfunction will, in
general, be rigid and brittle, unable to bend to the needs of the emergent
situation. 65 Tragically, therefore, when a heinous crime is charged and
execution is sought, a family with such a history may be least apt to
disclose family secrets and most likely to lapse into a pattern of almost
contagious despair. Indeed, psychologists have long identified apathyfutility syndrome, a pattern of maladaptation common among impaired
families .66
Members of CapitalDefendants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 382 (2003).
63

Of course, the capital defendant is part of that family; and not infrequently he

himself hampers life-history investigation and presentation. See, e.g., Knight v. Dugger,
863 F.2d 705, 750 (1 1th Cir. 1988) ("Petitioner did not want his family background or
history explored and made public for mitigation purposes. The lawyers testified that
Petitioner did not want the subject of his father brought out at the penalty phase.
Petitioner's lead attorney, Matthews, recalled that Petitioner did not want his family's
history of mental illness or his father's imprisonment for the rape incident to become
matters of public knowledge. Petitioner's reluctance was based, Matthews recalled, on
the intensely personal subject matter (which he had not been able to face in his adult life)
rather than mere embarrassment."). See also Letter from Stephen LaValle to Stuart M.
Cohen (Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals) (Feb. 12, 2001) (on file at the Capital
Defender Office and the Court of Appeals of the State of New York) (indicating
defendant's prospective refusal to involve himself or his family in penalty phase on
remand).
64 Beck et. al., supra note 63, at 406.
65According to the systems-theory model, which is applied to families, "systems
resist change if that change is perceived as a threat to stability or homeostasis. [The
systems-theory model can be used] to understand and explore both the pain of living with
family abuse and the resistance to change." KEMP, supra note 62, at 17.
66 The apathy-futility syndrome includes eight components: "(1) a pervasive
conviction that nothing is worth doing, (2) emotional numbness (sometimes mistaken for
depression), (3) interpersonal relationships that can be characterized as desperate and
'clingy,' (4) lack of competence in many areas of living (partially caused by fear of trying
and failing), (5) passive aggression or reluctant and hostile compliance, (6) negativism or
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Resembling - or perhaps co-existing with - a debilitating
depression, this syndrome would badly hobble any impulse to cooperate by
revealing mitigating evidence. To be clear, apathy-futility syndrome does
not spring from a lack of caring, but rather from a profound, pervasive,
long-instilled sense of helplessness. Any effort or attempt at rescue seems
to the sufferer to be doomed to failure. All is futile; the die is cast; what
will be will be.
Clouding any effort to surmount such pathological fatalism,
furthermore, is the counterintuitive nature of the mitigation project. As one
commentator noted:
Locating lay witnesses is only half the battle. Once you have
found them, you must succeed in obtaining from them the
information you need. In most cases lay witnesses are
initially suspicious of people asking questions about the client
because, like the client, their experiences have been with
individuals wanting to hurt them. Thus, time must be spent
demonstrating commitment and a sincere desire to save the
client's life.
One of the greatest hurdles in communicating with and
gaining the trust of lay witnesses is explaining that what they
may have thought was "bad" about theirfiend or loved one
67

is actually helpful information.

What is negative in the defendant's history is, in fact, positive. The
destructive episodes and elements from his life will now serve to construct
a case for letting him live. How easily do even people blessed with healthy
upbringings grasp this?
How eagerly do the members of a dysfunctional, neglectful, or
abusive family grasp it, especially absent any guarantee as to an impact on
case outcome? Take the siblings who shared an ordeal of physical or
sexual abuse and hoped it was behind them. Will not a significant number
decline to revisit and relive their past in public testimony? Won't many tell
themselves their testimony would not make a difference?
Take the adult bystanders who failed to stop abuse. Will they, who
noncommitment to positive stands, (7) verbal inaccessibility to others, and (8) an
uncanny ability in making others feel the same sense of futility." Id. at 99. It is precisely
this personality type that cannot rally in the service of saving the life even of a beloved
family member.
67

Lee Norton, Capital Cases: Mitigation Investigations, CHAMPION, May 1992,

at 43, 44 (emphasis added).
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abided the victimization of an innocent child, consistently step up years
later to (possibly) rescue an adult guilty of an intentional, aggravated
murder? Not consistently enough to stake a human life on it. 68
Take the defendant's abuser himself. Forget, for the moment, the
stigma or jeopardy that derives directly from that adult's abusive acts. 69 A
capital-sentencing phase potentially casts that adult as bearing an important
70
role in the creation of a violent criminal, a killer, the worst of the worst.
What percentage of such adults will thus inculpate themselves in the
inevitable media glare of a capital proceeding? Yes, it has happened. 71 But
how often does the truth go untold? 72 How often will it go untold if the
death penalty is deemed viable under the New York State Constitution?
68

Jeffrey Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the

ProgressionToward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 706
(2004) (Mitigating evidence "is often difficult to find" because factors "such as child
abuse, are not matters family members may be willing to discuss.").
69 Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric.Psychoeducational,and Family
Characteristicsof 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 584, 588 (1988) (remarking that parents had "vested interests in
concealing" abuse).
70 Beck et al., supra note 63 at 413 (discussing how interviews showed that
relatives of capital offenders experience "shame" about "mitigation which, though
essential to the defense, may be interpreted as suggesting the defendant's family is
culpable").
71 In the fall of 1994, Susan Smith killed her two sons by sending her car into a
South Carolina lake as the boys slept in the backseat; she then told a credulous public that
the car, children inside, had been seized by an African-American carjacker. At Smith's
trial, her stepfather, Beverly C. Russell, a state Republican executive committee member
and nephew of a South Carolina governor, initially resisted revealing his molestation of
his teenage stepdaughter; eventually, however, he testified on her behalf. Henry Eichel,
Smith Abuse Allegations Revealed, for Months, Her Stepfather Came into Her Room to
Kiss and Fondle Her, She Said, CHARLOTTIE OBSERVER, Apr. 12, 1995, at IC; Andrea
Weigl, Susan Smith's Steplather to Continue Supervised Visits with his Son, GREENVILLE
NEWS, June 16, 1999, at lB.
72 Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., supra note 70 , at 588-89 ("Family members
requested that histories of abuse be minimized" and "collude ... to minimize or conceal
entirely the violence and abusiveness experienced in the home"). See also Marilyn
Feldman et al., FilicidalAbuse in the Histories of 15 Condemned Murderers, 14 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 345, 351 (1986) (observing that families may be more
interested in concealing abuse than in helping the defendant); Winston v. United States,
172 U.S. 303, 313 (1899) (finding that the mitigating question of whether "explanatory
facts may exist which have not been brought to light is "committed by the act of
Congress to the sound discretion of the [capital] jury").
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And then, finally, how much more often will the truth go untold
where African- Americans are on trial for their lives? For here, once again,
race and racism complicate and exacerbate the death penalty's ever fallible
application. Owing to history and our yet incomplete journey toward racial
equality, some African-Americans "tend to be suspicious of requests by
White providers for intimate life details. It is seen by the African-American
Community as dangerous and potentially self-destructive to not hide one's
feelings from Whites until their trustworthiness can be assured., 73 What
has been coined "healthy cultural paranoia" among some AfricanAmericans dictates that they be wary of disclosing family secrets. 74
Besides feeling that they will not be helped, African-Americans will often
refrain from anecdotally affirming a dominant stereotype of Black families
as "disorganized, unstable and psychologically unhealthy. 75
Sentencing errors will occur; mitigation will go unheard. And
African-American capital defendants will be at greater risk for such
infirmities.
Does the passage of time or challenge of distance or barrier of
family-shame preclude the recovery of life-history evidence in every
penalty phase? Certainly not. At least in those jurisdictions that ensure
competent capital counsel, one can realistically hope that only a minority of
sentencing juries will be deprived of crucial life-history mitigation as they
choose between life and death. But it will be a significant minority,
significant enough to raise constitutional alarm. Moreover, a jury's hearing
life-history mitigation successfully gleaned by defense counsel is only the
start of a reliable sentence. Once heard, what is the jury to do with it?
What is it worth?
76

C. Mitigation in the Beholder's Heart

73 JERRY DILLER, CULTURAL DIVERSITY: A PRIMER FOR THE HUMAN SERVICES

70 (2d ed. 2004) (citations omitted).
74 FREDDY

PANAIAGUA,

ASSESSING

AND TREATING

CUI TURAILIY

DIVERSE

CLIENTS 34 (3d ed. 2005) ("Slavery and racism are two important factors in the history of

African-Americans in the United States . . . [a]n important consequence [of which] has
been the development of healthy cultural paranoia among African-Americans.")
(emphasis in the original) (citations omitted). This mistrust most certainly can extend to
counsel in a capital case.
75 Id. at 43.
76 Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) ("Mitigation ....

after all, may be

in the eye of the beholder.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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As noted, the threshold relevance of life-history mitigation is
obvious. A mitigation case takes for granted the defendant's grave moral
culpability for his crime; the issue is not whether to punish but how to
punish. The defense does not attempt to excuse, justify, or explain away.
Rather., pointing to developmental disadvantage, detriment, and damage, it
seeks the mercy of life imprisonment based on our awareness of diluted
accountability, diminished autonomy, or moral misformation.
Few, if any, on the defense side win contending that the capital
defendant is a mere cog in a cause-and-effect universe wherein freedom and
agency are only illusions.
Just as surely, few, if any, on the prosecution
side prevail contending that the capital defendant is simply a Lucifer, a
metaphysical rebel engaged in evil purely for the sake of evil or the sole
originator of his
own sinfulness, independent of outside influences and
78
encumbrances.
Penalty phase, then, is not a disputation between the Party of
Determinism and the Party of Free Will. It is a battle of gradations,
degrees, and emphasis. What weight does the life-history mitigation
deserve? How much does it explain about the defendant's violent
criminality? To what extent does it favor mercy'?
Virtually no one doubts that things outside the person help shape his
moral behavior. This truth transcends boundaries of time, faith, and
ideology. It finds voice in Hebrew and Christian scripture 79 (which
themselves exist to exert moral and spiritual influence). It finds voice in
the most secular contemporary thought.80 It issues politically from left-of77See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 123 n.4 (1982) ("Dr. Gagliano was
also willing to state categorically, on the basis of this single interview and without
reference to the results of the psychological testing of Eddings, that Eddings was
'preordained' to commit the murder from the time his parents were divorced, when he
was five. This sort of 'determinist' approach is rejected by an overwhelming majority of
psychiatrists.") (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
78"1want to talk about the concepts of free will and determinism. Doctrine of
free will ... versus what I would would submit to be the post-Freudian secularist view..
." People v. Dennis Alvarez, Westchester County, State's opening statement in penalty
phase resulting in deadlock, Trial Transcript, at 15777, May 15, 2003.
79 Genesis 3:1-19; Deuteronomy 20:18; 2 Samuel 1-13; Proverbs 1:1-8, 6:30,
22:6, 28:10, 29:17; Matthew 18:5-7,15-18; Luke 23:34; Romans 14:13; 1 Timothy 4:16, 1
Peter 2:12.
80 See generally ROBIN KARR-MORSE & MEREDITH S. WILEY, GHOSTS FROM
THE NURSERY: TRACING TIE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE (The Atlantic Monthly Press 1997)
(linking adult violent behavior to childhood neglect); ELI NEWBERGER, THE MEN THEY

WILL BECOME (Perseus Books 1999) (examining parents' roles in developing children's
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center;81 it echoes back politically from right-of-center.8 2 Even the least
sympathetic, most retributive observers
confess the connection between bad
83
outcome.
moral
bad
and
upbringing
Strong consensus exists as to very specific early risk85 factors for
86
84
violent adult criminality: poverty; abuse (direct or indirect); neglect;
moral systems).
81See generally HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE AND OTHER
LESSONS CIIILDREN TEACII US (Simon & Schuster 1996) (discussing ways of raising a
successful generation of adults).
82 See generally RICK SANTORUM, IT TAKES A FAMILY: CONSERVATISM AND

THE COMMON GOOD (ISI Books 2005) (advocating for strong family structures to help
raise successful children).
83 Peggy Noonan, They Should Have Killed Him. The Death Penalty Has a
Meaning, and it Isn't Vengeance, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2006, OpinionJournal Archives,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id= 110008330
("Of
course
[Moussaoui] had a bad childhood; of course he was abused. You don't become a killer
because you started out with love and sweetness.
Of course he came from
unhappiness.").
84"One national survey found that welfare status or perceived financial stress
was significantly related to children's emotional and behavioral problems - specifically,
to higher levels of depression, antisocial behavior, and impulsivity. Unemployment and
employment in poor quality jobs are systematically related to the arrest rates among
juveniles and young adults ... We also know about the way in which persistent poverty
is predictive of severe and recurrent child abuse. That is, '[v]iolence does occur at all
income levels but it is more often repeated among the persistently poor."' Craig Haney,
The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation.
35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 563-5 (1995) (citations omitted). See also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 447 ("Certainly the claim is justified that this [capital] sanction
falls more heavily on the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of
society. The 'have-nots' in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to
commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens. This is,
indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation
.
) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
85 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) ("Because Penry was mentally
retarded . . . and because of his history of childhood abuse, that same juror could also
conclude that Penry was less morally 'culpable than defendants who have no such
excuse.,") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE

FATALITIES,

THE

REPORT

TO

THE

GOVERNOR

(Oct.

http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/publications/fatality/part7.html#36)
In addition to death and physical injury, the consequences of domestic
violence in terms of'emotionaland developmental impact on children are
serious as well. 'Among preschoolers ...

signs of terror [are] evidenced

by the children's yelling, irritable behavior, shaking, and stuttering .
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88
noxious moral example; 87 and brain defect or damage.

.. Adolescent boys exposed to domestic violence may use aggressionas a
predominantform of problem solving.., and may exhibit a high degree
of anxiety.' Studies of children have indicated that children who witness
domestic violence at home, compared to those who do not, exhibit more
aggressive and antisocial behavior, depression, anxiety, low self-esteem
and low cognitive, verbal and motor skills. There are indications that
these children may replicate in their own adult lives the domestic
violence they witnessed.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Indeed, so great is the damage of abuse to a child's
moral-formation that the "'Commission recommend[ed] that a violent partner's
commission of acts of domestic violence against another adult or child in the family or
household be a sufficient basis for a charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child." Id.
The Commission even urged against any "requirement that the child physically witness
the conduct." Id.
86 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000) (finding counsel ineffective in
capital sentencing where adequate investigation would have revealed, inter alia, criminal
neglect of the defendant and his siblings). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
116 (1982) ("Eddings was not a normal 16-year-old; he had been deprived of the care,
concern, and paternal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, it is not disputed
that he was a juvenile with serious emotional problems, and had been raised in a
neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background."); Summerlin v. Schriro, 427
F.3d 623, 642 (9th Cir. 2005) (ineffective capital counsel did not demonstrate, inter alia,
defendant's desertion by his father); King v. Bell, 392 F. Supp. 2d 964, 979 (M.D. Tenn.
2005) (ineffective capital counsel failed to show, inter alia, that defendant "spent his
formative years in New York with little supervision"); Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567,
571-574 (Fla. 1996) (capital counsel ineffective at penalty phase where reasonably
available evidence would have revealed, inter alia, neglect).
87 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 167 n.7 (1986) (excerpting from
psychologist's report on sibling capital petitioners):
These most unfortunate youngsters were born into an extremely
pathological family and were exposed to one of the premier sociopaths of
recent Arizona history ...[Their murder-convict father] exerted a strong,
consistent, destructive but subtle pressure upon these youngsters . . .
There was a family obsession, the boys were 'trained' to think of their
father as an innocent person being victimized in the state prison but both
youngsters have made perfectly clear that they were functioning of their
own volition. At a deeper psychological level it may have been less of
their own volition than as a result of Mr. Tison's 'conditioning' and the
rather amoral attitudes within the family home.
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 449-51
(6th Cir. 2001) (faulty capital counsel failed to investigate and present evidence that
defendant, abandoned as an infant in a garbage can by his mentally ill mother, was raised
in a brothel run by his grandmother, where he was exposed to group sex, bestiality, and
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Any of these things, though not of the individual's choosing, may
skew his choices abominably. The relevance of life-history evidence is not
in issue. Its net effect is. How far should any life history move a jury away
from execution and toward imprisonment for life? The answer: It depends.
And here is the problem: As a practical matter, it depends as much on the
uniqueness of the juror as it does on the uniqueness of the defendant as
portrayed in life-history
mitigation. It is a breathtakingly subjective
89
determination.

pedophilia); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding capital
ineffectiveness found where sentencing jury never heard, inter alia, that defendant
repeatedly witnessed men violently abuse his mother); Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004,
1012 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding capital ineffectiveness found where jury never heard, inter
alia, about defendant's psychosexual deformity at the hands of parents, both of whom
intensely professed religious conviction, and one of whom severely beat the defendant
and the other of whom emotionally neglected and abandoned him); Gaines v. Thieret,
665 F. Supp. 1342, 1362-63 (N.D. II1. 1987), rev 'donother grounds, 846 F.2d 402 (7th
Cir. 1988) (finding Strickland prejudice where capital lawyer, inter alia, neglected to
show that the defendant had been put in an adult prison at age 15); Burris v. State, 558
N.E.2d 1067, 1075 (Ind. 1990) (finding Strickland prejudice where defendant, inter alia,
had been raised by a convicted killer).
88 In 1967, California Governor Ronald Reagan commuted a death sentence in
light of "pre-existing brain damage resulting in a chronic mental condition." Quin
Denvir, Executive Clemency: Restore It To Its Rightful Position, 26 C.A.C.J./Forum 10
(1999). See also Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-2469 (2005) (counting
evidence of fetal-alcohol syndrome among the mitigation withheld for want of reasonably
diligent capital counsel); Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 641-43 (identifying a temporal-lobeseizure disorder, possible organic-brain-syndrome, and impaired impulse-control among
the mitigation omitted by ineffective capital counsel); Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 63940 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding capital counsel ineffective where jury never heard about, inter
alia, defendant's multiple traumatic scars on the head, numerous head injuries, carbon
monoxide poisoning and frontal lobe damage); Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 941-43
(10th Cir. 2004) (finding ineffectiveness where capital jury did not learn about brain
damage due to a near drowning and oxygen starvation and how "organic brain damage
[could have] caused these outbursts of violence"); Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482,
490 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding second prong of Strickland satisfied where unbeknownst to
the jury, inter alia, defendant's early signs of mental disorder may have arisen from a
blow to the head with a dog chain wielded by his father); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d
1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding second prong of Strickland satisfied where,
unbeknownst to jury, capital defendant suffered, inter alia, severe head injuries in an
automobile accident, after which he heavily abused drugs and alcohol); Sanford v. State,
25 S.W.3d 414, 421 (Ark. 2000) (finding second prong of Strickland satisfied where,
unbeknownst to jury, defendant seemed a "bit slower" after suffocation under a load of
cotton seed and later suffered a blow to the head with a two-by-four wielded by his
sister.)
89 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1986) ("In a capital sentencing
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Whatever his intention, a concurring Justice Scalia underscored this
fact of capital life (or death) memorably in Walton.90 There, he abjured the
unlimited right to mitigation's consideration, a right anchored in Woodson,
Lockett, and Eddings, deeming the right both inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment's text and historical meaning and doctrinally unworkable.
Justice Scalia lamented:
We have . ..repeatedly rebuffed States' efforts to channel

that discretion by specifying objective factors on which its
exercise should rest. It would misdescribe the sweep of this
principle to say that "all mitigating evidence" must be
considered by the sentencer. That would assume some
objective criterion of what is mitigating, which is precisely
what we haveforbidden. Our cases proudly announce that the
Constitution effectively prohibits the States from excluding
from the sentencing decision.., that the defendant had a poor
and deprived childhood, or that he had a rich and spoiled
childhood; that he had a great love for the victim's race, or
that he had a pathological hatred for the victim's race; that he
has limited mental capacity, or that he has a brilliant mind
which can make a great contribution to society; that he was
kind to his mother, or that he despised his mother. Whatever
evidence bearing on the crime or the criminal the defense
wishes to introduce as rendering the defendant less deserving
of the death penalty must be admitted into evidence and
considered by the sentencer.91
But, for Justice Scalia, the infirmity does not dwell simply in the
lack of gatekeeping. The problem is not merely that capital defendant
Smith may prove he acted wholly out of character, while, down the hall,
capital defendant Jones may prove his acts flowed naturally from his longdamaged psyche. No, adding to the randomness is the jurors' radical
discretion. The states may not embargo any potentially mitigating evidence
and each juror may make of it, and make with it, what she will.
proceeding before a jury, the jury is called upon to make a 'highly subjective, unique,
individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.'
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340, n.7 (1985) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment))") (subquotation marks
omitted) (parallel citations omitted).
90Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639.
91Id. at 662-63 (emphasis altered) (citations omitted).
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Nor may States channel the sentencer's consideration of this
evidence by defining the weight or significance it is to receive
. . . Rather, they must let the sentencer "give effect" to
mitigating evidence in whatever manner it pleases. Nor,
when a jury is assigned the sentencing task, may the State
attempt to impose structural rationality on the sentencing
decision by requiring that mitigating circumstances be found
unanimously; each juror must be allowed to determine and
"give effect" to his perception of what evidence favors
leniency, regardless of whether those perceptions command
92
the assent of (or are even comprehensible to) other jurors.
Mitigation, then, bears no objective value 93 and operates in no
objectively prescribed, or even described, fashion. The jury neither wields
a common yardstick against which to measure mitigation nor enjoys a
common understanding
of the manner in which mitigation can, may, or
94
extenuate.
must
Nobody can specify the measure of mercy that ought be engendered
or will typically be engendered
by, say, total parental abandonment
before defendant reached the age of twelve; 95 or defendant's unsuccessful
92

Id. at 663-64 (emphasis altered) (citations omitted).

93 More precisely, it bears no objective value that we can collectively discern
with a reasonable degree of confidence. Right and wrong, along with degrees of good
and degrees of fault, exist independent of our opinions and imaginings; there is
nonrelative moral truth. Our laws would otherwise make no sense. Nor would our
intense attention to the legitimacy of execution.
94 Justice Scalia makes plain, finally, that the paradoxical, unpredictable,
subjective character of mitigation is not an illusion or surface imperfection. It is not a
shadow or blemish giving rise to quizzical anomalies, apparent or real; it is a cancer
eating at the goal of consistency:

To acknowledge that "there perhaps is an inherent tension" between this
line of cases [Woodson-Lockett-Eddings] and the line stemming from
Furman, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S., at 363 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), is rather like saying that there was perhaps an inherent
tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II. And to
refer to the two lines as pursuing "twin objectives," Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S., at 459, is rather like referring to the twin objectives of good

and evil.
Id. at 664 (parallel citations omitted).
95 July Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Alvarez, (May
23, 2003) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, Indictment No. 1352/00).
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teenage attempt at enlistment in the United States Navy; 96 or the paroleeligibility of defendant's co-perpetrator; 97 or defendant's suffering severe
physical abuse as child; 98 or defendant's growing up with an habitually
criminal father-figure eventually convicted of murder 99 or defendant's
birth to a thirteen-year-old whose own father raped and otherwise abused
her;100 or defendant's cocaine dependence; 101 or defendant's weeping with
remorse in the immediate wake of his crime; 10 2 or the absence of a father
figure, owing to the suicide of defendant's father when defendant was two
years of age; 10 3 or defendant's mother telling him as a young boy that he
96

Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Bell, (June 28,

1999). (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, Indictment No.
128/97).
97 Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Glanda, (Feb. 7,
2000) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Essex, Indictment No. 99023).
98 Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Forms, People v. Parker, (Oct. 24,
1998) (State of New York, County Court of Erie, Indictment No. 97-0762); Jury
Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McIntosh, (July 23, 1998)
(County Court of the State of New York, County of Dutchess Indictment No. 146/96);
Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Owens, (Apr. 30, 2001)
(Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Monroe, Indictment Nos. 547/99,
414/99); Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McCoy, (Aug. 16,
2000) (County Court, Suffolk County, State of New York, Court Case No. 2582-98); Jury
Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Mateo, (Dec. 16, 1998) (County
court of the State of New York, County of Monroe, Indictment No. 0914/96); Jury
Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Alvarez, (May 23, 2003)
(Supreme Court of the State of New York, Indictment No. 1352/00); Jury Sentencing
Determination and Findings Form, People v. Gordon, (Dec. 18, 1998) (Supreme Court of
the State of New York, County of Queens, Indictment No. 273/97).
99 Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Gordon, (Dec.
18, 1998) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, Indictment No.
273/97).
1ooId.
101Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Gordon, (Dec.
18, 1998) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, Indictment No.
273/97).
102 Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. LaValle, 697
N.Y.S.2d 241 (Aug. 6, 1999) (Suffolk County Court No. 1350-97).
103 Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Mateo, (Dec. 16,
1998) (County Court of the State of New York, County of Monroe, Indictment No.
0914/96).
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would grow up to be a murderer like his father; 10 4 or defendant's mother
strangling to death his father in the one-room-apartment where defendant,
less than three years of age, and his siblings lived; 105 or defendant's
childhood diagnosis of schizophrenia and ongoing institutionalization; 10 6 or
defendant's childhood of ridicule, on account of a severe speech
impediment; 10 7 or defendant's malnourishment as a child;10 8 or defendant
hearing his mother's cries as his father beat her; 10 9 or defendant's finding a
suicide note left by his drug-overdosed mother when he was nine years
old; 0 or defendant's sudden childhood isolation upon his mother's
conversion to a religion that forbade participation in birthdays, celebrations,
holiday festivities, and community recreation programs; 1 1 or defendant's
lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions involving the use
of violence; 11 2 or defendant's growing up fair-skinned, red-headed, and
13
consequently hated by his father in a poor, remote Puerto Rican village;
or defendant's father leveling death threats against his entire family;" 4 or
defendant's suicide gesture as a thirteen-year-old on the day of his father's
funeral; 115 or defendant's requiring admission to a psychiatric unit and
104

_[d.

105

Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McCoy, (Aug.

16, 2000) (County Court, Suffolk County, State of New York, Court Case No. 2582-98).
106Id.
107 Jury

Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. McIntosh, (July

23, 1998) (County Court of the State of New York, County of Dutchess Indictment No.
146/96).
108Id.
109Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Owens, (Apr.

30, 2001) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Monroe, Indictment Nos.
547/99, 414/99).
11 id.
111Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Forms, People v. Parker, (Oct.
24, 1998) (State of New York, County Court of Erie, Indictment No. 97-0762).
12 Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Taylor,
(Nov.
26, 2002) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County, Indictment Nos.
1845/00, 1012/01).
113 Jury Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Santiago, (June
23, 2000) (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Essex, Indictment No.
99-023).
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lithium injections after discovering his suicidal brother's body. 116
Mercy dispensed in response to the same mitigation will differ from
juror to juror and from jury to jury. 1 17 Nothing allows us to imagine
reasonable 8 predictability, consistency, or transparency honesty forbids us
1
to do so. i
D. HardSciences: Hardly the Answer
Direct life-history evidence is not the only form of mitigation that
115 Jury

Sentencing Determination and Findings Form, People v. Shulman, (May

6, 1999) (County Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk, Indictment No.
1112-96).
116

117 Alongside the problem of one juror's giving mitigating evidence maximal

weight and another's assigning it minimal weight, there hides another threat to reliability:
the danger of some jurors' treating mitigation as aggravation. In Penry, Justice Brennan
- ever attune to the gap between capital theory and capital practice - noted that merely
requiring that a defendant's mental retardation be considered by the jury did not protect
against those who would sidestep the equity of reduced culpability and fixate oil the
retarded defendant's future dangerousness or the dim "possibility of his ever becoming a
useful citizen." 492 U.S. at 346-47 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting "Upholding Law and Order, Hartsville Messenger, June 24,
1987, p. 5B, col. 1).
Under New York's 1995 statute, sentencing juries have heard prosecutors argue
that: a defendant's heroic and dangerous rescue of a (then) fellow corrections officer
should have made the defendant "more sensitive to people who were helpless and in need
before he killed, not one, not two, but three of them execution style" (Record on Appeal
at 20286, People v. Harris (Kings County, Indictment No. 15265/96)); a defendant's lack
of criminal convictions should not weigh heavily against execution, but "in fact that the
opposite is true. If the defendant had been convicted of crimes in the past, perhaps we
can see some sort of explanation for the premeditated killing of Charlie Davis and Mike
Epstein" (Trial Minutes at 14060, People v. Bell (County of Queens, Indictment No.
128/97)); John Taylor's children's testimony as to his fathering and their love for him
represented his failure to "spare" them a courtroom ordeal and his willingness to reduce
them to "props." Brief for Appellant at IX (Taylor's Children), 9 N.Y. 3d 129, (N.Y.
2007).
118 Appellate resignation to the subjective nature of the capital-sentencing
enterprise and resultant lack of jury uniformity is hard to miss. See, e.g., State v. Cross,
132 P.3d 80, 103, 105 (Wash. 2006) (en bane) ("A jury could have granted him mercy on
these [mitigating] factors" including "his underlying mental disease or defect.";
"[A]busive childhood and medically diagnosed personality disorders (that do not rise to
the level of competence-destroying mental illness) do not necessarily render a death
penalty disproportionate, though they are certainly grounds for ajury to show mercy.").
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engenders mercy by showing how factors not within the defendant's control
shaped and shunted the defendant, undercutting though not supplanting his
autonomy. Increasingly, the hard sciences reveal influences on behavior
more suggestive of the laboratory scientist's universe than the less linear
realm of the compassion-tainted social worker.
One might hope that hard science would render more precise,
verifiable, and quantifiable those things that put a person at risk for
homicidal behavior and that hard science would provide the new language
through which we understand the realities now imperfectly proffered in
life-history narratives. Maybe in the future. Who knows?
Currently, however, the intersection of hard science and capital
mitigation only highlights additional reasons to distrust the reliability of
penalty-phase determinations.
Genetic research makes ever clearer that some people come into the
world with a particular vulnerability to violence, 119 or addiction potentially
leading to violence. 120
Longitudinal study has identified very early
cardiovascular characteristics predictive of aggressive behavior, 121 just as it
119 For example, one genetic deficit, when combined with early maltreatment, has

been strikingly linked to greatly heightened risk for violent adult behavior. Researchers
following a large sample of young males for almost a quarter century found behavioral
problems in 85% of those who suffered early mistreatment or abuse and whose DNA
revealed a genetic variation leading to under-expression of a particular enzyme monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) - needed to metabolize neurotransmitters. This group,
making up 12% of the cohort, accounted for 44% of the cohort's violent crimes. A
Genetic Defense Against Child Abuse?, Harvard Mental Health Letter, Mar. 2003, at 8,
(citing Avshalom Caspi et al., Role qf Genotpe in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated
Children, 297 SCIENCE 851-54 (2002)).
120 See, e.g., K. Blum et al., Allelic Association of Human Dopamine D2 Receptor
Gene in Alcoholism, 263 JAMA 2055 (1990). K. Xu et al., Association of Specific
Haplotypes of D2 Dopamine Receptor Gene with Vulnerability to Heroin Dependence in
2 DistinctPopulations,61 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 597-606 (2004). See also Avshalom
Caspi et al., Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a Polymorphism in
the 5-HTT Gene, 301 SCIENCE 386 (2003) (finding that adults carrying the short-form of
a particular gene more prone to clinical depression after experiencing distressing life
events).
121 "The basic finding [of the Mauritius Child Health Study] was that low resting
cardiac rate in toddlers predicted aggressiveness and anti-social tendencies at a betterthan-chance level even when environmental factors, such as social deprivation and
broken homes, and biological factors, such as body size, activity level, physical
development, muscle tone, and general health were controlled for . . . [Y]oungsters at
high risk for criminality because they had criminal fathers were more likely to avoid
crime if their resting heart rates during childhood were high." JONATHAN KELLERMAN,
SAVAGE SPAWN 89 (The Ballentine Publishing Group 1999).
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has linked the combination of birth complication and early maternal
rejection with criminal violence in early adulthood.
Environmental
exploration and analysis have uncovered compelling links between certain
forms of pollution (i.e., metal, lead, pesticide) and heightened incidence of
violence.123 Military science and media studies have combined to make a
startling case against play violence as a cause of lethal violence. 24 Even
dietary risk factors for violence have emerged from nutrition studies. 125 On
the apolitical, non-polemical plane of reason, this would seem a promising
development for the capital-sentencing enterprise. The more an analysis
122

Adrain Raine et al., Birth Complications Combined with Early Maternal

Rejection at Age 1 Year Predispose to Violent Crime at Age 18 Years, 51 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 984 (1994).
123 Paul B. Stretesky & Michael J. Lynch, The Relationship Between Lead
Exposure and Homicide, 155 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED 579 (2001) (studying airlead concentrations in the contiguous 48 states, along with county homicide rates, and
finding association between violent behavior and lead exposure); Kim N. Dietrich et al.,
Early Exposure to Lead and Juvenile Delinquency, 23 NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND
TERATOLOGY 511 (2001) (both in utero and ex utero exposure to lead found associated
with risk for antisocial and delinquent behaviors), ROGER D. MASTERS FT AL.,
Environmental Pollution, Neurotoxicity. and Criminal Violence, in 7 ENVIRONMENTAL
TOXICOLOGY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (J. Rose Ed., 1998) (discussing lead and
manganese in their effect on individual neurochemistry and demonstrating their
environmental levels as predictive of geographical differences in violent crime rates).
See also Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding counsel
ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of client's brain damage due to
prolonged pesticide exposure and repeated head injuries, and failing to present expert
testimony explaining "the effects of the severe physical, emotional, and psychological
abuse to which Caro was subjected as a child").
124 "Another way to look at this is to make an analogy with AIDS . . . The
[inborn] 'violence immune system' exists in the midbrain, and conditioning in the media
creates an 'acquired deficiency' in this immune system. With this weakened immune
system, the victim becomes more vulnerable to violence-enabling factors, such as
poverty, discrimination, drug addiction . . . or guns and gangs .... ." LT. COL. DAVE
GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING To KILL IN WAR
AND SOCIETY xix (Little, Brown and Company 1996) (parentheticals omitted). See
generally SISSELA BOK, MAYHEM: VIOLENCE AS PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENI' (Perseus

Books 1998) (suggesting reasons behind and solutions for television violence inciting
real violence).
125 C. Bernard Gesch et al., Influence of Supplementary Vitamins, Minerals and
Essential Fatty Acids on the Antisocial Behaviour of Young Adult Prisoners:
Randomized, Placebo-controlled Trial, 181 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 22 (2002); Joseph R.
Hibbeln, Seafood Consumption and Homicide Mortality: A Cross-National Ecological
Analysis, 88 WORLD REV. NUTR. DIET 41 (2001).
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takes root in the physical world - the world of brain and biology, as
opposed to the world of mind and sociological construct
the greater the
prospect for exactitude and authentication. correct?
One would think. In reality, however, mass culture virtually
inoculates many jurors against genuine consideration of mitigation
evidence born of highly specialized knowledge. Furthermore, even among
those experts most conversant in these newer species of mitigation,
comprehension of violence-inducing effects remains too rudimentary to
surmount jurors' visceral aversion. Hard science then imparts to us not
assurances but notice of all we have yet to learn about influences on and
causes for human behavior.
Entertainment and news media resound with cynical, distorting
laments about criminal defendants who escape accountability through an
"abuse excuse" or "Twinkie defense." It is telling that the phrase "Twinkie
defense" has gained such currency as shorthand for a sham state- of-mind
claim that it was recently invoked in the United State Supreme Court.
During oral argument, Justice Scalia - apparently voicing the perspective
of a factually guilty, remorseless criminal defendant
challenged a
government lawyer's claim that any competent defense counsel could be
safely substituted for chosen defense counsel: "I don't want a 'competent'
lawyer ....
I want a lawyer to get
me off. I want a lawyer to invent the
126
win."
to
want
I
defense.
Twinkie
More telling, there never really was a "Twinkie defense." Yes,
death-penalty defendant Dan White, a former San Francisco city
Supervisor, garnered only manslaughter convictions after shooting Mayor
George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. Yes, the jury heard about
White's consumption of Twinkies and other snack foods.
But,
overwhelmingly, expert testimony and defense argument pointed to
White's junk diet (along with other things) as symptomatic not causal. 127
126 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Case on Right to Choose Defense Counsel,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at A17.

127Carol Pogash, Myth of the 'Twinkie Defense': the Verdict in the Dan While
Case Wasn't Based on His Ingestion of Junk Food, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 23,
2003, at DI (noting, inter alia, defense's summation brief gave tepid mention of "a
minority of opinion in psychiatric fields" that high concentrations of preservatives and
sugar can alter behavior). See also Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 304
F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1377 n.7 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (noting that White defense "offered junk
food use as proof of White's mental state
in other words, Twinkie consumption was an
effect rather than the cause of White's problems. But the media and public immediately
and misleadingly - dubbed the defense's argument the 'Twinkie defense."').
The myth of the "Twinkie defense" flourishes in many ideological climates.
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White's incessant ingestion of soda and cream-injected cakes helped signal
the deep depression in the once athletic, formerly nutrition-conscious
White, a depression that precluded premeditation and deliberation and
diminished his mental capacity. As for the underlying suggestion that
White was more slick than sick,
he killed himself by asphyxiation not long
12
after his release from prison. 8
The average capital juror, who will weigh mitigation in New York or
elsewhere, will not know about the mentally-ill White's suicide. Nor will
she know that, Twinkies aside, a double- blind, placebo-controlled,
randomized trial of nutritional supplements administered to 231 young
adult prisoners in a British correctional facility resulted in a marked
reduction in antisocial behavior among the "active"
i.e., non-placebo1 30
group.1 29 She will only "know" about the contrived "Twinkie defense."
Alas, in today's polemical environment, it is a steep hill any capital
defendant climbs, should he attempt to link something as gut-wrenching as
the unjustified, intentional murder of an innocent human being to
something so theoretical as defendant's genotype or nervous system. The
climb shifts from steep to near vertical insofar as a hard-science framework
implies to jurors that the defense will be able to explain just how the given
mitigation affected the defendant they must sentence. For, at this stage of
scientific understanding, nobody even pretends to certainty when it comes
to explaining, for instance, just why certain lumbar cerebrospinal fluid
concentrations, along with certain levels of skin conductance, prove
predictive of physical aggression and institutionalization in children and
Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz, over a decade ago, wrote: "Many observers
wondered whether White's 'Twinkie defense' - he ate too much sugar because of junk
food - would have worked as well had his victim not been gay." ALAN DERSHOWITZ,
THE ABUSE

EXCUSE:

AND

OTHER COP-OUIS,

SOB

STORIES,

AND

EVASIONS

OF

RESPONSIBILITY 41 (Little, Brown and Company 1994).

128 Nancy Skelton & Mark A. Stein, S.F. Assassin Dan White Kills Himself L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985, at 1.
29

1

See generally Gesch et al., supra note 126.

130 None

of this means to say that only the most abstract scientific evidence

comes in for caricature and derision. Mitigation more readily comprehended by the lay
person has also long suffered jaded ridicule from some quarters. Sondheim & Bernstein,
Gee, Officer Krupke, on West Side Story Musical Soundtrack ("Dear kindly Sergeant
Krupke, You gotta understand, it's
just our bringin' up-ke, that gets us out of hand. Our
mothers all are junkies, our fathers all are drunks. Golly Moses, natcherly we're
punks!").
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adolescents with disruptive behavior disorders, 13 1 or how malnourishment
at age three sets a child up for behavior problems that, in turn, predispose
him to adult violence, 132 or the mechanism by which a mother's smoking
while pregnant quadruples the chance that a son will be diagnosed with
conduct disorder before puberty, 133 or the meaning of the high testosterone
concentrations found to134accompany both psychopathology and geneticallyinfluenced alcoholism.
More importantly, while at times science can quantify the increased
risks posed by factors of nature or nurture, it can only do so in the abstract.
That is, statistical calculations will inform us about the likelihood of effects
on the average individual but not on the particular capital defendant whose
life has invariably been handicapped by other risk factors.
And here - in the problem of assessing multiple risk factors and
their negative synergy
we find perhaps the most overwhelming obstacle
to reliable sentencing.
Offenders' weaknesses, extenuators, and vulnerabilities constitute
"diverse frailties" belonging to "uniquely individual human beings,"' 13 5 in
large part, because they inflame, infect, and intensify one another. This is
an unhappy truth for the capital prosecutor, because it undercuts a popular,
simplistic motif of capital prosecution: A lot of people are physically
abused (or neglected or sexually brutalizedor abandonedor raised amidst
violence . . . ) and most of them do not become murderers.136 The
Markus J.P. Krusei et al., A 2 Year Prospective Followup Study Qf Children
and Adolescents With DisruptiveBehavior Disorders:Predictionby CerebrospinalFluid
5-Hydroxyindoleacetic Acid, Homovanillic Acid, and Autonomic Measures?, 49 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 429 (June 1992).
132 Jianghong Liu et al., Malnutrition at Age 3 Years and Externalizing Behavior
131

Problems al Ages 8, 11, and 17 Years, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2010 (2004) ("It is

possible that malnutrition predisposes to a general disinhibitory tendency and that broad
cultural differences influence the precise manifestations of such disinhibition at a
behavioral level.").
133 Myrna Weissman et al., Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy and
Psychopathology in Offspring Followed to Adulthood, 38 AM. ACAD. CHIILD ADOIESC.
PSYCHIATRY 892 (1999). See also Patricia A. Brennan et al., Maternal Smoking During
Pregnancy and Adult Male Criminal Outcomes, 56 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 215 (1999)
(through study of over 4000 males, showing prenatal smoking related even to persistent
post-adolescent criminality).
134 E. Gunilla Stflenheim et al., Testosterone as a Biological Marker in
Psychopathy and Alcoholism, 77 Psychiatry Research 79 (1998).
135 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
136

Michelle
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significance of risk factors in destructive combination, nonetheless, has
repeatedly centered capital decisions from the Supreme Court.
In Rompilla, 13 7 the Court invalidated a death sentence because of
counsel's failure to discover and present mitigating evidence that the
defendant's parents were severe alcoholics who drank constantly, that his
parents fought violently and seriously abused and neglected him and his
siblings, and that he appeared to have suffered from fetal-alcohol syndrome
and organic brain damage. The Court concluded: "It goes without saying
that the undiscovered 'mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well
have influenced the jury's appraisal of Rompilla's culpability ....

Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith, 139 the Court set aside the death
sentence in light of the "powerful" ".totality"of the mitigating evidence that
counsel had failed to unearth and present. 140 This included evidence that
the defendant had
experienced severe privation and abuse in the first six years
of his life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee
mother. He suffered physical torment, sexual molestation,
and repeated rape during his subsequent years in foster care.
The time Wiggins spent homeless, along with his diminished
mental capacities, further augment his mitigation case.
[Wiggins] thus has the kind of troubled history we have
declared relevant
to assessing a defendant's moral
14 1
culpability.

Finally, in casting the deciding votes in Williams, 142 Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined in a concurring opinion that similarly
explained how the totality of mitigating risk factors was determinative:
Williams' trial counsel failed to conduct an investigation that
would have uncovered substantial amounts of mitigation
Circumstance?, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 22, 1996. ("'Lots of people have terrible
childhoods and most of them do not become murderers,' said Kent Scheidegger,
executive director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Sacramento.")
137Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456.
131Id. at 2469 (internal punctuation and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

139
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
140Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
141Id. at

534-35.

142 Williams, 529 U.S. at 415.
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evidence. For example, speaking only of that evidence
concerning Williams' 'nightmarish childhood,' the mitigation
evidence that trial counsel failed to present to the jury showed
that Williams' parents had been imprisoned for the criminal
neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been
severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been
committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two
years during his parents' incarceration (including one stint in
an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were
released from prison, had been returned to his parents'
custody... More generally, the Virginia Circuit Court found
that Williams' trial counsel failed to present evidence
showing that Williams had a deprived and abused upbringing;
that he may have been a neglected and mistreated child; that
he came from an alcoholic family [and] that he was
borderline

mentally

retarded ... The Virginia

Supreme

Court's decision reveals an obvious failure to consider the
totality of the omitted mitigation evidence. 143
Courts readily grasp the need to see risk factors in destructive
combination. Commentators do as well. Almost a decade ago, Judy
Briscoe, Texas Youth Commission Chief of Staff and Director of
Delinquency Prevention, addressed risk factors from a preventative policy
perspective:
The Carnegie study identified many risk factors in a child's
life, e.g., personality, physical health, family, social/peer
influence, neighborhood, community, school, and individual
interaction with the environment. Risk factors are often
multiplicative, not additive, in their effects. 'When children
showed only one risk factor, their outcomes were no worse
than those of children showing none of the identified risk
factors. But when children had two or more risk factors, they
were four times as likely to develop social and academic
problems ....144
143

Id. at 415-16 (O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
14461 FED. PROBATION 3 (1997) (quoting Starting Points. Meeting the Needs of
Our Youngest Children, The Report of the Carnegie Task Force on Meeting the Needs of
Young Children (1991)) (emphasis added). See also National Institute of Mental Health,
Fact Sheet: Child and Adolescent Violence Research, at 2 (Apr. 2000)
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More in-depth examination of multiple risks, by Cornell Professor

James Garbarino, has educed ever starker concurrence regarding the
multiplicative danger. In 1998, he wrote:
[W]e have come to understand in child development research
that the presence or absence of any single risk factor tells us
very little about the outcome for a child. Rather, it is the
accumulation of risk factors. This emerges over and over
again in research when it is designed to reveal it. It may be
accurate to say that runaways and drug addicts and sexually
abused children come from all strata of society, but it is not to
the point because the point is that victimization, when
coupled with other risk factors, is what really does the
damage. 145

In 1999, Garbarino described the same truth more concretely:
Threats accumulate; support ameliorates. The presence of
only one or two risk factors does not disable a child. Rather,
it is the accumulation of threats that does the damage. And
trouble really sets in when these threats accumulate without a
parallel accumulation of compensatory "opportunity" factors.
Once overwhelmed, defenses are weakened the next time the
child faces threat. Children and adolescents become highly
sensitive to any negative social influences around them. I
look at it this way: Give me one tennis ball, and I can toss it
up and down with ease. Give me two, and I can still manage
easily. Add a third, and it takes special skill to juggle them.
Make it four, and I will drop them all. So it is with threats to
development. 146
http://www.healthyplace.com/communities/parenting/nimh/children)violence/index.htm
("Many studies indicate that a single factor or a single defining situation does not cause
child and adolescent antisocial behavior. Rather, multiple factors contribute to and shape
antisocial behavior over the course of development. Some factors relate to characteristics
within the child, but many others relate to factors within the social environment (e.g.,
family, peers, school, neighborhood, and community contexts) that enable, shape, and
maintain aggression, antisocial behavior, and related behavior problems.").
145James Garbarino, Children in a Violent World: A Metaphysical Perspective,
36 FAMILY & CONCILIATION CoURTs REv. 360, 362 (July 1998) (citation omitted).
146 JAMES GARBARINO, LOST Boys: WHY OUR SONS TURN VIOL ENT AND HOw

WE CAN SAVE THEM 75-76 (Free Press 1999).
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Finally, University of California Santa Cruz Professor of Psychology
Craig Haney deals with multiple risks in the context of the death penalty:
It is possible to think of these mitigating variables or
experiences as "risk factors" that when added up over the
course of a life form a whole that is greater than its individual
parts. Many capital defendants have led lives that are the
criminogenic equivalent of being born into hazardous waste
dumps
Love Canals of crime
being exposed to crimeproducing carcinogens since birth, breathing the social and
psychological equivalents of smog-infested air through most
of their young lives and into adulthood. They have had risk
factor dumped upon risk factor over the course of a life
impoverished, abused kids, the targets of racism. poor
schools, badly botched treatment or no treatment at all in the
juvenile justice system, unemployment, harsher treatment still
at the hands of a warehousing adult prison system, and on and
on.
We do no justice to these issues by oversimplifying them or
by pulling them out, one by one, and saying that "not
everybody" who experienced any one of them reacted the
way a particular capital defendant did. A life is an
accumulation of interacting variables and it needs to be
understood in that way. For most capital defendants, the risk
factors are so many and varied that the real issue is not why
"not everybody" responded this way but rather how anybody
147
could survive and why more people do not succumb.
The analogy to Love Canal is powerful, but it is imperfect in at least
one respect. In Love Canal the damage to individuals was, in part,
empirically demonstrable. Roughly two years after a newspaper series
ignited concerns about toxic waste hazards around Niagara Falls, the
Environmental Protection Agency announced blood test results showing
148
chromosomal damage among residents of the Love Canal community.
147 Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the
Logic qf Mitigation,35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547, 600-01 (1995) (citations omitted).
148 Irvin Molotsky, Love Canal Medical Study Backed, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,

1980, at B4.
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Thus some causal mechanism emerged making the concentrated presence
of chemical refuse and reportedly higher incidents of birth defects and
cancer less arguably a matter of coincidence.
There is nothing equivalent to a lab test by which a capital defendant
can demonstrate the behavioral impact of mitigating risk factors. Medical
science does not afford us an X-ray, CAT scan, or MRI of a defendant's
developmentally-crippled conscience. A stunted superego won't reveal
itself on an ultrasound. His moral state does not open up to flow cytometry.
Yes, brain imaging can, in certain instances, suggest organic damage
or defect compromising of impulse control. But this technology is
underdeveloped, inexact, and
hardly beyond the reach of abuse-excuse,
149
derision.
"Twinkie-defense"
E. Mental Health Experts and Deliverancefrom Error
And, yes, experts regularly provide forensic assessments of mental
health.
Their opinions pretty much moor some noncapital legal
determinations. 150
The law, though, has been emphatic about the
limitations
at least fourfold
of mental health evidence. These
limitations cannot be squared with the notion of mental-health experts as
verifiers or quantifiers of mitigation.
First, within the mental-health sciences, controversy often edges out
consensus even as to abstract categories and diagnoses. In Clark v.
Arizona,15 1 the Supreme Court upheld Arizona's restriction of mental149 See generally Tie-Qiang Li et al., Adolescents with Disruptive Behavior

DisorderInvestigated Using an Optimized MR Diffusion Tensor Imaging Protocol, 1064
ANNALS OF N.Y. ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 184 (2005) (white-matter microstructural
abnormality, observed through imaging, may be related to developmental deficits):
Adrian Raine, Murderous Minds: Can We See The Mark of Cain?, I CEREBRUM: THE
DANA FORUM ON BRAIN SCIENCE 16, 22, 29 (1999),
available at
http://wxvw.dana.org/news/cerebrum/detail.aspxid-3066 ("It is possible, for example,
that prefrontal dysfunction does not cause violence; instead, living a violent life
(including substance abuse and fights) may cause the brain dysfunction we observed."
Additionally, "[b]rain-imaging research is beginning to give us new insights into what
makes a violent offender. These early findings may at least lead us to rethink our
approach...").
1s0 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("Whether the individual is
mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of [involuntary]
confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists.")
151 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
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health evidence to the consideration of sanity but not mens rea. It strongly
noted how a "diagnosis may mask vigorous debate within the15psychiatric
2
profession about the very contours of the mental disease itself."
With peer debate naturally comes new and inevitably changing
understanding. As if to stress that any end of such debate or settling of
understanding "is not imminent,"' 153 Justice Souter, writing for the majority,
echoed a decision a half-century old: "The only certain thing that can be
said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding
mental
154
disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment."
Second, even putting aside shifting criteria, diagnosis of a real
person is not as simple as a checklist; it entails inference, interpretation, and
informed intuition. In condoning a civil-commitment burden lower than
reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court in Addington openly acknowledged
"lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis." 155 It stated:
The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render
certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations. The
reasonable-doubt standard of criminal law functions in its
realm because there the standard is addressed to specific,
knowable facts. Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a
large extent based on medical "impressions" drawn from
subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the
diagnostician. This process often makes it very difficult for
the expert physician
to offer definite conclusions about any
56
particular patient. 1
Uncertainty clouds the science of mental health when applied to a
person and compounds when that person is a party to a proceeding. The
third problem with mental health evidence arises from diverging statutory
152

Id. at 2734.

153 Id.
154 Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also O'Connor v.

Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579 n.2, 585 n.5 (1975) ("It is not for us to say in the baffling
field of psychiatry that 'milieu therapy' is always a pretense."; "Indeed, there is
considerable debate concerning the threshold questions of what constitutes 'mental
disease' and 'treatment."') (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted);
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 126 n.8 ("One might even be surprised if a person capable of a
brutal and unprovoked killing of a police officer did not suffer from some sort of
'personality disorder."') (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
'55 Addington, 441 U.S. at 429.
151Id. at

430.
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and clinical purposes. "[E]ven when an expert is confident that his
understanding of the [defendant's] mind is reliable, judgment addressing
the basic categories of capacity requires a leap from the concepts of
psychology, which are devised for thinking about treatment, to the concepts
of legal sanity,
which are devised for thinking about criminal
157
responsibility."
Finally, all these things combine with limited juror ability to
evaluate and integrate testimony from mental-health experts:
Evidence of mental disease, then, can easily mislead; it is
very easy to slide from evidence that an individual with a
professionally recognized mental disease is very different,
into doubting that he has the capacity to form mens rea,
whereas that doubt may not be justified. And of course, in
the cases mentioned before, in which the categorization is
doubtful or the category of mental disease is itself subject to
controversy, the risks are even greater that opinions about
mental disease may confuse a jury into thinking the opinions
show more than they do. Because allowing mental-disease
evidence on mens rea can thus easily mislead, it is not
unreasonable to address that tendency by confining
consideration of this kind of evidence to insanity, on 58
which a
1
persuasion.
of
burden
the
assigned
be
may
defendant
Mental-health experts then are guides not gods, even if some jurors
will mistake them for the latter when presented by the defense or the
prosecution. We cannot rely on mental-health experts as guarantors against
the killing of defendants who, though factually guilty, are not death-worthy.
No matter their credentials or good faith, psychologists and psychiatrists
cannot certify mitigation and thereby offer assurances against wrongful
execution. On the contrary, restrictions on, and reservations over, their role
in our justice system only raise troubling questions.
If decisive understanding of the mind and its disorders is nowhere in
sight after decades of well-funded, professionally-refereed mental-health
studies, what moral confidence can we claim in the lethal judgments
emerging from sentencing proceedings that don't even aspire to scientific
151Clark, 126

S.Ct. at 2736.
158Id. at 2735. See also Basciano v. Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1978)
("[T]he value of cross-examination to discredit a professional medical opinion at best is
limited.").
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rigor?
If "inexactness and uncertainty" plague proceedings for the
determination of competency,1 59 what can be said about penalty phase?
Because the psychiatric diagnostician reckons outside the realm of
"specific, knowable facts," certainty ordinarily eludes her. How many
galaxies (or dimensions!) farther away from the realm of "specific,
knowable facts" is the capital juror calculating the significance of a
nightmare-life-history in relation to a horrific sodomy-murder or a stonecold contract killing?
The concepts of psychology, because they are devised for thinking
about treatment, ill-prepare the mental-health expert to grapple with the
concepts of legal sanity, which are devised for thinking about criminal
responsibility. From just what conceptual framework does the capital juror
embark when he grapples with concepts devised for deciding whether or
not to spare someone execution in favor of lifelong imprisonment? Or are
there as many frameworks as jurors?
States may conclude that jurors cannot be trusted to parse and
evaluate mental-health testimony as it bears on starkly delineated mens rea;
jurors can be easily mislead. Still, somehow we can rely on jurors to hand
down an irrevocable, ultimate sentence after figuring out the relationship of
mental-health evidence to the shape-shifting ideas of mitigation and
aggravation?
It makes no sense.
We, as a society, would engage in mass hypocrisy were we to latch
on to mental-health professionals as unerring distillers of mitigation or
invincible guardians of capital sentencing reliability.
F. The Killer of Race
Race seems to add strain to every crack in the machinery of death.
Certainly, it heightens the danger arising out of the subjectivity of
mitigation and other vagaries of capital sentencing. Most often, the defense
mission in capital sentencing is to get one or more jurors to look at the
defendant and think: "There but for the grace of God. . ." or "There but for
fortune .... " The defense aims to create a moment of empathy,
even if
160
that moment lasts a fraction of a fraction of a fraction of a second.
159 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 353 (1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
160 Welch S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel In Capital Cases: The

Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 361 (1993) ("[C]ounsel has
several objectives: to make the sentencer empathize with the defendant... In every case,
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The truth, however, is that race is a barrier to empathy, that both
group affinities and aversions regularly cloud judgment and erode fairness.
This may bespeak the Human Condition, the American Condition, or the
American Condition 2006, when great progress toward racial justice lies in
our past and our future. It is, in any event, the plain (if awkward) truth. It
is as plain as the wildly disproportionate, often-obsessional
media attention
161
generated by crimes against white victims.
It is as plain as those well-designed, Wall Street Journal-reported
experiments showing that a black job applicant with no criminal record
competes at a slight disadvantage against a white applicant who informs his
prospective employer that he has completed an eighteen-month sentence for
possessing cocaine with intent to sell; or showing that, on written job
applications, a white-sounding name (e.g., Emily Walsh), as opposed to an
African-American-sounding name (e.g., Lakisha Washington), confers a
leg-up equal to eight additional years of work experience. I62 As plain as a
study demonstrating that, adjusting for all relevant variables, a less
stereotypically black face could save an African-American defendant eight
months on his sentence of imprisonment. 163
Or as plain as a more recent study showing that, among
Philadelphia's interracial capital prosecutions of African-Americans, a
more stereotypically black defendant ran a risk of a death sentence more
the capital defendant's attorney should seek to *humanize' the defendant . . . The
sentencer will then be more likely to empathize with the defendant.").
161 When black immigrant college student Romona Moore disappeared in 2003,
New York media paid little attention, instead focusing on a white middle-aged female
book dealer who had gone missing. When a verdict was returned against one of the men
charged in Moore's killing, three years later, New York media attention was
overwhelmingly centered on the murder of a white immigrant graduate student. See
generally Michael Brick, Awaiting Verdict, Victim 'sFamily Feels 2003 Killing Is
Eclipsed Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at B1. See also Lynnell Hancock, Wolf
Pack: The Press and The CentralPark Jogger, 41 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 3 8 (Jan. 1,
2003) ("[Reporting the Central Park Jogger story] got very emotional,' says Anne
Murray, police bureau chief for the New York Post at the time. ... 'I knew the coverage
would be very different if the victim weren't white."'): Jessica McBride, Racial Bias
Reflected In Media Focus On Runaway Bride, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, May 15,
2005 ("It's also hard to miss the fact that the cases of missing girls and women who've
drawn media attention involved photogenic Caucasian females.").
162David Wessel, Racial DiscriminationStill at Work, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4,
2003, at A2.
163 Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afiocentric Facial Features In Criminal
Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 674 (Oct. 2004).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol11/iss2/6

2007-20081

LETHAL CRAPSHOOT

64
than twice as great as that run by a less stereotypically black defendant. 1
As plain as Justice Scalia's admission as to the "ineradicab[ility]" of the
"irrational sympathies,
including racial" that play on the juror's
165
unconscious.
Too often, race will thwart the empathetic impulse.
It will
desensitize many jurors to mitigating risk factors in a capital defendant's
life history. This would be troubling even if the racially prejudiced were
not overrepresented on capital juries. It is all the more troubling in light of
evidence suggesting racially prejudiced citizens may serve on capital juries
at a higher than average rate. 166

Maintaining a death penalty in a society with America's racial
history is like building a munitions depot on a volcano or an in vitro lab at
Love Canal. It does not simply invite danger; it conscripts it.

IV. CONCLUSION: MORTAL CONSEQUENCES AND MORTAL BEINGS

All too often, a penalty phase will be a constitutionally unreliable
determination waiting to happen. It is a multi-step process wherein error at
any step can result in a wrongful death sentence. Yet, realistically, every
step carries a significant risk of error.
Perhaps added precautions and safeguards might reduce risk, might
lessen the frequency with which the mercy of life-without-parole is
wrongfully withheld. The problem, though, arises not from how we
attempt penalty phase but from the very enterprise itself That enterprise necessitating ajury's weighing "considerations that are often unquantifiable

1,4

See Jennifer

L. Eberhardt

et.

al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived

Stereotypicality of Black Dejfndants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes,

17

PSYCIJOL. SCIENCE 383 (May 2006), available at http://www.psychologicalscience.org/
pdf/ps/deathworthy.pdf.
165 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 339 (Pantheon Books

1997). (quoting Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Antonin Scalia in
McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-6811, Jan. 6, 1987, available in McCleskey v. Kemp File,
Thurgood Marshall Papers, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
166 Using data from the 1990 and 1996 General Social Survey, Professor Robert
L. Young found racial prejudice greater by a rough third among those respondents whose
views on capital punishment would likely allow them to survive death qualification.
Robert L. Young, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Conviction Orientation, Racial
Attitudes, and Supportfor CapitalPunishment, 25 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 151 (2004).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008

324

UNIi. OrPEN JLVAV7AJORAL OrLAV ANDSOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. I11

167
and elusive ... when it determines whether a defendant deserves death,'
is irreformable.
In a day when we can incapacitate murderers through life without
parole, penalty phase is an exercise in unalloyed hubris. In contrast to a
guilt determination, it is unnecessary. And its premise, that we can render
irrevocable judgment on a person's moral and spiritual state, would make
Prometheus blush.
Granted, all criminal law both springs from and hands down moral
judgments. Agreed, all criminal law necessarily engages in a sort of mind
reading, insofar as mens rea ordinarily anchors penal liability. Conceded
too, every capital jurisdiction equips a sentencing jury with special
vocabulary, distinctive labels, designated factors, delineated tests, and clear
standards of proof. These supposed instruments of characterological
assessment, however, can neither conceal nor conquer the unique task
capital jurors are asked to perform: soul reading, divining the good and evil,
virtue and vice, depravity and grace that reside in the capital defendant.
Opponents of capital punishment sometimes claim that we, as a
society, "play God" when we execute, despite a fundamental right to life.
At least as correctly, we "play God" when we attempt to sort those worthy
of mercy from those worthy only to die. This task simply mocks the paltry
powers of fallible humanity. Its continued attempt ensures lethal mistakes.

167

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005).
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